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Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter 
By LEAH CHAN GRINVALD* 
Introduction 
THE U.S. REPUTATION FOR LITIGIOUSNESS is so pervasive that it has 
entered our cultural fabric: books and articles have been written about it and 
a variety of popular media have satirized our infamy.1 There is a paradox, 
though. Statistics show that approximately only three percent of all legal 
disputes are brought to the judicial system.2 Of this three percent, only a 
small fraction of disputes are litigated to a final decision.3 How can 
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 1. See, e.g., Seinfeld: The Maestro (NBC television broadcast Oct. 5, 1995) (satirizing Liebeck v. 
McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994), 
vacated, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994)). In this episode of Seinfeld, one of the main 
characters, Kramer, sues a local coffee shop for serving him coffee that was “too hot,” burning his 
stomach (because he had attempted to sneak the coffee hidden in his waistband into a movie 
theater). Id. 
 2. See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary 
Results, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 749, 761 (2004). 
 3. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 585, 589 (2008); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
375, 377 (2014). 
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Americans still be so litigious while simultaneously having fairly low per 
capita rates of lawsuits?4 This Article suggests that the growing practice of 
resolving disputes through the use of abusive cease-and-desist letters is the 
answer to this paradox.5 Cease-and-desist letters are abusive when they 
contain a threat (implicit or explicit) of litigation if the target does not comply 
with the letter’s demands, as well as one or more of the following items: 
unnecessary legalese (including unsubstantiated statutory citations), demands 
for a settlement within a short time frame, demands for immediate payment 
of some form of fees, and/or weak legal claims.6 Based on this growing trend 
and the potential harms these letters bring, this Article proposes that when 
abusive cease-and-desist letters are sent to vulnerable populations, such as 
small businesses or individuals, a certain amount of policing is needed. 
While there are no comprehensive statistics documenting how many 
cease-and-desist letters are sent each year, there are strong indications of 
increasing frequency at least in the intellectual property field.7 For example, 
a recent qualitative empirical study evaluating experienced intellectual 
property attorneys found that almost all of the interviewed attorneys handled 
the majority of their clients’ disputes through cease-and-desist letters.8 These 
 
 4. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, 
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (stating that current litigation rates in the United 
States are not exceptionally high). The per capita rate of litigation in the United States is similar to 
that of peer nations, such as England and Australia. Id.; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and 
Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 
198182 (2002). 
 5. See, e.g., Eriq Gardener, How to Write an Effectively Nasty Lawyer Letter, HOLLYWOOD REP. 
(July 18, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marty-singer-cease-and-desist-letter-
350612 (“In the cutthroat world of Hollywood law, the pen can be mightier than the sword. With 
litigation costs skyrocketing and court dockets clogged, a forceful cease-and-desist letter is 
increasingly a much quicker and more effective weapon than the sharp blade of litigation. But it is 
not without risks.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Letter from Diane M. Reed, Attorney, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP, to 
Christopher J. Day, Law Office of Christopher Day (Sept. 4, 2009) (on file with author) (requiring 
compliance with the listed demands within two weeks from date of letter); Letter from Nat’l Football 
League to Ms. Thom, Fleurty Girl (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file with author) (requiring compliance with 
the listed demands within nine days from date of letter). 
 7. See Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 85457 (2012) (discussing the rise in trademark bullying through the 
sending of cease-and-desist letters); Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist 
Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 784 
(2010) (“[C]ease-and-desist letters are frequently utilized in disputes concerning intellectual 
property and represent an important feature of the intellectual property law landscape.”). 
 8. William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of IP Law, 28 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453, 48182 (2012) (describing the phenomenon as 
“demand letter lawyering”). 
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same lawyers admitted that where such letters are sent to small businesses or 
individuals, it was often more effective to be “abusive.”9 While the study 
participants do not use the term “abusive,” the manner in which they enforce 
rights against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals, 
can be deemed abusive under this Article’s definition.10 In addition, these 
lawyers also admitted that they tended to enforce claims through cease-and-
desist letters, even where the lawyers believed the claims had little merit.11 
Further, the fact that state government and legislative entities believe there is 
a current need to address the issue of “patent trolls,”12 provides support for 
this growing trend.13  
Although there are a variety of influences spurring the increased use of 
abusive cease-and-desist letters, four likely culprits are (1) the exorbitant cost 
of litigation and its outcome uncertainty, (2) the lack of legal consequences 
for sending such letters, and (3) the effectiveness of the letters. Litigation is 
expensive, and therefore, it is in the intellectual property rights holders’ best 
economic interest (even for multinational corporations with large legal 
budgets) to try to and resolve disputes without resorting to litigation.14 
Additionally, in certain areas of the law (in particular, in intellectual property 
law), the outcome of litigation is not easily predicted due to the uncertainties 
 
 9. See id. at 478. 
 10. See id.; see also infra Part I.B (discussing four factors that create an abusive cease-and-desist 
letter). 
 11. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 475, 481 (stating that one of the themes of the study was the 
extent to which the participants enforced weak claims). 
 12. “Patent trolls” are typically defined as business entities that have obtained patent rights 
for the sole purpose of obtaining licensing fees through coercion (such as threats of litigation). See 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT’L ECON, COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. & 
TECH. POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND 
INNOVATION 34 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT]. The specific problems related to 
patent trolls have been extensively explored in academic literature and have also been highlighted 
as an executive-level policy concern to the U.S. economy. See id. at 1213; James Bessen, Jennifer 
Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 2 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship 
/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-no-11-45rev.pdf (“We find that NPE lawsuits 
are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010 . . . .”). 
See also infra Part III.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen. Office, A.G. Schneiderman Announces 
Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive “Patent Troll” (Jan. 14, 2014), http://ag.ny.gov/press-
release/ag-schneiderman-announces-groundbreaking-settlement-abusive-%E2%80%9Cpatent-
troll%E2%80%9D [hereinafter N.Y. Press Release]. 
 14. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (citing Bruce Sewell, Intel’s General Counsel, who 
estimates Intel’s costs for dealing with patent infringement claims are around three to five million 
dollars per year). 
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in the applicability of some doctrines and their corresponding defenses.15 
Furthermore, the patchwork of regulation and laws that could provide some 
deterrence for sending cease-and-desist letters is ineffective. Currently, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct,16 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, newly enacted state laws, and consumer 
protection laws (as enforced by state attorneys general or the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC)) have the potential to police abusive cease-and-desist 
letters.17 
However, this Article’s review of these potential forms of regulation 
reveals severe limitations that allow abusive cease-and-desist letter senders to 
virtually evade any form of legal consequence.18 Therefore, abusive letters 
remain effective because the same incentives that encourage rights holders to 
send abusive cease-and-desist letters disincentivize the targets to fight back. 
Moreover, when abusive cease-and-desist letters are sent to small businesses 
and individuals, it is almost certain that such targets will immediately 
capitulate.19 The effectiveness of such letters is due to a confluence of three 
factors that create a coercive settlement process—an abusive letter, 
asymmetrical disputants, and certain characteristics of small businesses and 
individuals.20  
This Article argues that more effective and coordinated tools are needed 
to police abusive cease-and-desist letters. Specifically, the approach needs to 
directly address the characteristics of small businesses and individuals in 
order to be successful. One such proposal is adopting federal or state 
legislation, similar to the recently passed state-level, anti-patent troll 
legislation,21 but with a broader focus. This “anti-abusive threats” legislation 
 
 15. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 65761 (2011) 
(identifying three factors that lead to the unpredictability of trademark infringement lawsuits). 
 16. As enacted by individual states. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. Id. One limitation includes the myopic focus on “patent trolls.” See infra Part III.C. 
 19. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478 (“Q: Why go after the little guy? A: Ease. It’s easy often. 
You can often get them to roll over with a few threats and some sweet talk. . . . Threats means we’ll 
sue your sorry little company if you don’t stop.”). See also William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals 
for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 120607 (2008) (noting 
that cease-and-desist letters are frequently effective); William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of 
Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1547, 1569 (2006). 
 20. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478. 
 21. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-state-
patent-legislation/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2015) (providing an interactive map of states with different 
stages of anti-patent troll bills, showing that twenty-two states have signed legislation into law). 
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would provide targeted parties with a cause of action against the sender of 
an abusive letter. The legislation would provide for a “fast-track” resolution 
of the abuse claim by a judge, as well as contain an attorneys’ fee-shifting 
provision if the sender’s letter was deemed abusive.22 With the potential for 
recovering attorneys fees and fast-track resolution, more attorneys would be 
willing to represent small businesses and individuals on a contingency fee 
basis.23 Adequate representation would assist in overcoming this population’s 
inability to information-gather, as well as its susceptibility to inducement.24 
Since adopting legislation may not be immediately forthcoming, and since it 
does not combat all the characteristics of this vulnerable population, this 
Article proposes supplemental, holistic measures that could also assist. These 
proposals include greater involvement by state bar associations and the ABA 
through issuing a formal ethics opinion regarding the direct applicability of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
Additionally, this Article proposes that state attorneys general should more 
aggressively interpret their current consumer protection laws to allow them 
to take further action against senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
Part I provides an overview of the cease-and-desist letter process and 
defines this Article’s use of the term “abusive cease-and-desist letter.” Part II 
discusses the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that render 
them susceptible to these abusive letters. Part II also conducts an analysis of 
the incentives that rights holders have to send an abusive letter. Part II 
further examines the problems associated with sending abusive cease-and-
desist letters, including philosophical concerns with coerced agreements. Part 
III examines existing mechanisms that could serve to police abusive cease-
and-desist letters, including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
recently enacted state legislation, but ultimately concludes that such 
mechanisms do not effectively regulate this legal gray area. 
In response, Part IV provides a number of proposals, including revised 
federal and/or state legislation aimed at curbing abusive cease-and-desist 
letters for all types of legal actions. Part V proactively addresses a number of 
concerns that may be raised in response to these proposals, including the 
 
 22. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
 23. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65657 (citing small businesses and individuals’ lack of 
monetary resources as a hurdle to accessing adequate legal resources for intellectual property 
disputes). 
 24. See Carrie Johnson, Rights Advocates See ‘Access to Justice’ Gap in the U.S., NPR (Mar. 10, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/10/288225649/rights-advocates-see-
access-to-justice-gap-in-u-s (reporting on recent research conducted by Columbia Law School’s 
Human Rights Clinic showing that individuals with access to counsel fare considerably better in 
civil legal disputes). 
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concern that implementing new legislation to combat abusive cease-and-
desist letters may encourage additional litigiousness by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
However, Part V provides suggestions to counter these concerns. This Article 
then briefly concludes that the problems in this area are serious enough to 
outweigh the concerns.  
I. The Cease-and-Desist Letter Process 
Private dispute resolution is not a new phenomenon. A number of 
empirical studies from the latter part of the twentieth century show that most 
disputes are negotiated privately, without recourse to the judicial system.25 
The current statistics of per capita civil litigation in the United States 
supports this conclusion: only three percent of all civil disputes proceed to 
litigation,26 and of this number, approximately one percent progress to a 
judicially-determined result.27 Despite the actual statistics, the U.S. 
reputation for litigiousness maintains its resonance.28 This Article asserts that 
one of the answers to the paradox of the U.S. reputation for litigiousness is 
the growing trend of settling disputes through cease-and-desist letters, and in 
particular, the use of abusive cease-and-desist letters to coerce a private 
settlement.29 
Although there are few statistics to prove this overall trend, Professor 
William Gallagher’s empirical study of the enforcement of intellectual 
 
 25. See DAVID M. TRUBEK, JOEL B. GROSSMAN, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, HERBERT M. 
KRITZER & AUSTIN SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT S-7576 
(University of Wisconsin Law School, 1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, 
and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 543 (19801981); Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 6162 
(1963). 
 26. See Landes, supra note 2, at 761. 
 27. This statistic only encompasses federal district court civil cases for the twelve month 
period ending September 30, 2013. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS: 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2013 tbl. C-4, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C04Sep13.pdf. 
But see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 
6 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2009) (suggesting a higher percentage goes to trial). 
 28. See supra note 1. 
 29. See infra Part III.C (providing “patent troll” cease-and-desist letters as an example of this 
growing trend). See also infra Part I.B (defining “abusive” cease-and-desist letters). Cf. J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation Rates 3940 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion 
Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 681, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf (suggesting 
that America’s reputation for litigiousness partly stems from the mishandling of securities class 
action and mass tort lawsuits). 
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property rights by attorneys offers some support.30 His qualitative study of 
fifty-eight experienced intellectual property lawyers found that almost all 
conducted their dispute resolution by using cease-and-desist letters, which 
typically resulted in a privately negotiated settlement.31 In fact, only five of 
these seasoned attorneys had ever actually litigated more than three cases.32 
Additionally, more than one-third of the participants had never brought a 
trademark or copyright case to trial over the course of their careers.33 
Further, these participants admitted that where such letters are sent to small 
businesses or individuals, strategically it was often more effective to be 
“abusive.”34 One of the study’s conclusions was that the study participants 
routinely enforced “weak” claims without any perceived ethical dilemma.35  
In addition, recent state governmental actions against “patent trolls”36 
that send abusive cease-and-desist letters to small businesses also provides 
evidence for the conclusion that abusive cease-and-desist letters have been 
on the rise.37 For example, the state attorneys general in New York, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Vermont, have all taken action against a 
notorious patent troll for sending abusive letters to small businesses within 
 
 30. See generally Gallagher, supra note 8. In addition, a counter-factual is also helpful as proof 
of the growing trend. See also Megan Garber, This Cease-and-Desist Letter Should be the Model for Every 
Cease-and-Desist Letter, THE ATLANTIC (July 23, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/technology/archive/2012/07/this-cease-and-desist-letter-should-be-the-model-for-every-cease-
and-desist-letter/260170/#. It was speculated that this cease-and-desist letter will go down in 
history as the “most polite, encouraging and empathetic” letter ever to be sent, and was a viral 
Internet sensation. Debra Cassens Weiss, Jack Daniel’s Cease-and-Desist Letter Goes Viral for Being 
Exceedingly Polite, A.B.A. J. (July 26, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article 
/jack_daniels_cease-and-desist_letter_goes_viral_for_being_exceeedingly_poli/. 
 31. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 465, 48182. 
 32. Id. at 465. Professor Gallagher excluded Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) 
trials from counting as litigation since such trials are not conducted in person. Id. at 465 n.52. The 
low number of surveyed attorneys having litigation experience could partially be due to the fact 
that some simply preferred a transactional practice—if cases did not settle, some would refer cases 
to a more seasoned litigator instead of handling it themselves. Id. at 465 n.53. 
 33. Id. at 465. The range of the survey participants’ experience in intellectual property 
enforcement ranged from five to forty years. Id. 
 34. While the study participants do not use the term “abusive,” the manner in which they 
enforce rights against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals can be 
deemed abusive under this Article’s definition. See id. at 478; see also infra Part I.B. 
 35. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496. 
 36. See sources cited supra note 12. 
 37. These state-level governmental actions have been in the form of legislation for “bad faith 
assertions of patent infringement” and state attorneys general actions against certain patent trolls 
for sending abusive letters. See, e.g., 9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195 (West 2015); N.Y. Press Release, 
supra note 13. 
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their states.38  
While Professor Gallagher’s numbers are restricted to a small sample of 
intellectual property attorneys, and the governmental actions have been 
limited, there are enough anecdotes to support the conclusion that the rise of 
abusive cease-and-desist letters are not limited to the intellectual property 
field.39 Unfortunately, abusive cease-and-desist letters are most problematic 
when the letters target low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and 
individuals. 
A. Overview of the Cease-and-Desist Letter Process 
The Internet has been one of the main drivers for the increased use of 
cease-and-desist letters in legal dispute resolution. Potential violations of 
one’s rights are easily discoverable with specialized software or even by 
conducting a quick Google search.40 This means that previously unknown 
violations of rights can now be detected, which causes a dilemma for the 
party whose rights may have been violated by a third party: Should they 
enforce their rights or ignore the purported violation? One of the reasons for 
the overall rise in cease-and-desist letters in some areas of the law, like 
intellectual property, is the misconception that rights holders need to enforce 
each and every single perceived violation of their rights or they risk losing 
them.41 
The actual cease-and-desist letter process is fairly straightforward. After 
discovering a perceived legal right violation, an individual or entity sends a 
letter to the violator, identifying the entity’s rights and the unlawful actions 
of the violator. The letter will demand that the violator cease and desist in its 
actions.42 Depending on the type of violation, the letter may demand 
 
 38. Julie Samuels, It’s a Bad Week to be a Patent Troll: Big Updates from New York and Newegg, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/its-bad-week-be-
patent-troll-big-updates-new-york-newegg. 
 39. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letters, ABOVE THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/tag/cease-
and-desist-letters/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (showcasing abusive cease-and-desist letters covering 
various legal claims). 
 40. See, e.g., BitMatch, S.A.F.E., http://www.safe-corp.biz/products_bitmatch.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
 41. Cf. Devan R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1833 (2007); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:91 (4th ed. 2014). 
 42. There are a number of websites with template cease-and-desist letters. See, e.g., Cease & 
Desist Letter Templates, Examples & Sample Forms, THOMPSON HALL SANTI CERNY & DOOLEY, 
http://thompsonhall.com/cease-desist-letter-template-example-sample-forms/ (last visited Mar. 
16, 2015); Cease and Desist Letter Template, ROCKETLAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com 
GRINVALD_FINALFORPRINT_GUNEY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/25/2015 1:06 PM 
Issue 3] POLICING THE CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTER 417 
 
additional actions be taken (i.e., removal of defamatory language on a 
website).43 Additionally, the letter will typically contain a threat, either 
implicit or explicit, that if the target does not respond to the letter, the sender 
will investigate its legal remedies, which may include litigation. Upon receipt 
of the cease-and-desist letter, the recipient has a choice to either comply with 
the demands or fight back.44 Compliance is typically achieved through 
entering into some type of settlement agreement, whether through an 
affidavit of compliance by the target, or a more extensive negotiated 
agreement.45 Although there are no statistics available on the success rate of 
cease-and-desist letters, anecdotally, it appears that the vast majority of 
disputes begin and end with the cease-and-desist letter, particularly where 
the letter is abusive.46 
There are two noteworthy aspects of the typical cease-and-desist letter 
process. First, the cease-and-desist letter process is typically conducted 
between asymmetrical disputants. Although entities of all sizes enforce their 
legal rights, it appears that the larger the company, the more likely it is to 
initiate court action or arbitration.47 The reason for this is that well-resourced 
entities typically have the funds to either hire outside legal counsel or 
maintain a staff of in-house attorneys.48 Second, as settlement is the typical 
outcome of cease-and-desist letters, the whole process is conducted outside 
of the judicial system. This fact raises the importance of non-judicially related 
laws and needed regulations in this area. However, there are currently no 
 
/article/cease-and-desist-letter-template.rl (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
 43. The violation can vary from defamation, harassment, breach of contract, to infringement 
of an intellectual property right. See Cease & Desist Letter Templates, Examples & Sample Forms, 
THOMPSON HALL SANTI CERNY & DOOLEY, supra note 42. 
 44. Defending oneself against a claim of legal rights violations can involve formal legal 
actions, like filing for a declaratory judgment, or informal actions, like public shaming. See Grinvald, 
supra note 15, at 631; see also Part III.B.1 (discussing declaratory judgment actions). The use of public 
shaming can be successful, however, it requires certain factors to be present for its success. Grinvald, 
supra note 15, at 66667 (discussing the four factors required for a successful shaming campaign 
against a trademark bully). 
 45. See, e.g., Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, Partner, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & 
Cohn LLP, to Jeff Britton, Owner, Exit 6 Pub and Brewery LLC (Dec. 9, 2013) (on file with author) 
(requesting written assurances of compliance to demands contained in letter); Settlement 
Agreement, Estate of James Joyce and Carol Loeb Shloss, Mar. 19, 2007, available at 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Shloss%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf (settling 
copyright infringement claims). 
 46. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478. 
 47. FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY: 
FINDINGS 8 (2005). 
 48. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65556. 
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effective laws and regulations for cease-and-desist letters, placing a great deal 
of discretion upon the senders to appropriately draft such letters and 
negotiate a fair settlement.49 Unfortunately, there are a variety of incentives 
that encourage sending abusive cease-and-desist letters in order to guarantee 
a non-judicial, or private, settlement.50 Prior to discussing these incentives, it 
is important to understand the elements that make a cease-and-desist letter 
“abusive.” 
B. Defining Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters 
While not all cease-and-desist letters are abusive, an informal review of 
cease-and-desist letters posted on public websites reveal that the average 
cease-and-desist letter is not a friendly, merit-worthy missive intended to 
encourage a non-adversarial or fair settlement.51 Contained within almost all 
cease-and-desist letters is a threat of litigation (either implicit or explicit). This 
threat alone does not cause the letter to be abusive; rather, it is this threat, 
combined with one or more factors that create the abuse. This section will 
outline four factors that can create an abusive letter, however, these factors 
are not exclusive and the absence of one factor does not automatically mean 
a letter is not abusive. Ultimately, it is the totality of the letter that determines 
its characterization. 
1. Inappropriate Legalese, or Other Harsh and Insulting 
Language 
Lawyers often write using legalese or “lawyerly” language.52 Using 
legalese may be appropriate at times, such as when quoting from a statute,53 
however, when communicating with non-lawyers, the legal profession has 
come to find that legalese is not only unnecessary, but often completely 
 
 49. See infra Part III (discussing the ineffectiveness of current enforcement efforts). 
 50. See infra Part II.B. 
 51. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letters, ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 39 (showcasing abusive cease-
and-desist letters). This Article acknowledges that the letters that receive media attention are likely 
going to be reflective of extreme abuse, as to be deemed newsworthy. 
 52. “Legalese” is defined as “the specialized language of the legal profession that is [usually] 
complicated and often unintelligible to an outsider.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 
1290 (unabr. ed. 1986). 
 53. Although some plain English activists would disagree with this. See Andy Mergendahl, 
Legal Writing in Plain English as Culture War, LAWYERIST (May 11, 2013), 
http://lawyerist.com/64667/legal-writing-in-plain-english-a-culture-wa/ (“[F]or a number of 
reasons, florid, complex writing strewn with legalese does a poor job of communicating, whether 
the reader is a lawyer, judge, or layperson (like a client).”). 
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unwarranted.54 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
requires that disclosure documents are written in “plain English,” and urges 
the profession to push for clarity in drafting all documents.55 Distinguishing 
between appropriate legalese and inappropriate legalese is challenging; 
however, when a cease-and-desist letter is sent to a non-lawyer, this Article 
argues that using legalese is always inappropriate. There is no reason to use 
legalese other than as an intimidation tactic, and a cease-and-desist letter can 
easily convey its seriousness in plain English. 
Additionally, inappropriate use of legalese also includes citing to legal 
authority without referencing the substance of the law56 when the letter is 
sent to a non-lawyer.57 Similar to using Latin phrases or lawyerly language, 
lawyers cite to laws in an attempt to provide legitimacy to the legal claims. 
This tactic is particularly useful where the claims are meritless or weak. 
Where the letter is sent to another attorney, simply including a citation to the 
relevant law is warranted, as attorneys have the resources to find the citation. 
However, where the letter is sent to a non-lawyer, it is unlikely that the 
recipient will be able to access the cited law or have the resources to hire a 
lawyer to do so for them.58 Therefore, legal citations without inclusion of the 
source are simply an attempt at intimidating the target to capitulate to the 
letter’s demands.  
While including a copy of the cited law in a cease-and-desist makes sense 
where it is sent to a non-lawyer, critics may argue otherwise. Critics may 
argue that even when the sender attaches a copy of the cited statute to the 
letter, it is unlikely that a non-lawyer target would be able to interpret the 
law due to the complicated language found in most statutes. While this 
criticism has merit, including a substantiated statutory citation gives the 
target the opportunity to read and attempt to interpret the law (or find a 
friend or family member to do so on their behalf). 
Further, harsh or insulting language is also a contributing factor to 
 
 54. See, e.g., Nora Rock, Five Good Reasons to Avoid “Legalese,” PRACTICEPRO (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://avoidaclaim.com/2014/five-good-reasons-to-avoid-legalese/. 
 55. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO 
CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998). 
 56. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 628. Including quotations, hyperlinks, or attachments of 
the cited statutory authority are all acceptable methods of referring to the law. 
 57. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, Partner, Jones Day, to Registrant of 
www.kevynorr.com (June 10, 2014) (on file with author) (“Continued unauthorized use of these 
marks constitutes, at a minimum, service mark infringement, service mark dilution, and false 
description in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. and state law.”). 
 58. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 64849. 
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determining whether a letter is abusive. In fact, the dictionary defines 
“abusive” as “employing harsh or insulting language.”59 While using 
insulting language is not frequently seen in letters containing inappropriate 
legalese, it is important to note that harsh or insulting language is never 
appropriate in a letter asserting one’s legal rights.60 
2. Demands for Quick Settlement  
A demand to complete a transaction at once is the hallmark of a 
coercive settlement and is arguably one of the most common traits of abusive 
cease-and-desist letters.61 For example, in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist.,62 the 
California Court of Appeal noted the fact that Mr. Odorizzi was coerced into 
resigning his job because his employer demanded that he resign immediately, 
without time for reflection or outside counsel, was an important factor in 
potentially voiding the agreement.63 Typically, an abusive cease-and-desist 
letter demands that a target respond within a very short time frame, often 
between three and fourteen days.64 For example, one abusive letter stated, 
“The complaint is prepared, and we will file it next week if we do not receive 
an acceptable response from you [in five days].”65 One week does not provide 
a target with any meaningful time to find an attorney. Even if a target were 
to retain an attorney, this type of short time frame does not allow the attorney 
to conduct a thorough analysis of the claims or prepare a response letter by 
the stated deadline.66 In this situation, the only viable option for a target is to 
capitulate and accede to the demands of the letter, regardless of the legal 
merits of the claims. 
While there is some value to the counter-argument that providing a 
short time frame in a cease-and-desist letter is necessary to ensure that a 
 
 59. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 8 (unabr. ed. 1986). 
 60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2013). A lawyer has the obligation 
to maintain “a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal 
system.” Id. 
 61. The recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws also include this item as a factor in 
determining a “bad faith” assertion of patent infringement. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-
1703(2)(d) (West 2014). 
 62. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
 63. See id. at 541 (characterizing the demand as exerting undue influence). 
 64. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57 (giving target three days to 
respond); Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, supra note 45 (giving the target two weeks to respond). 
 65. Letter from Robert W. Payne, Attorney, LaRiviere, Grubman & Payne LLP, to Michael 
Shkolnik (June 7, 2002) (on file with author). 
 66. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 64849. 
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target takes the sender’s demands seriously, other benchmarks provide 
enough time for retention of an attorney, and for the attorney to conduct a 
proper analysis and response.67 For example, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides a minimum timeframe of twenty-one days for a 
defendant to respond to a newly filed summons and complaint.68 The 
circumstances of a newly sued defendant is similar to that of a cease-and-
desist letter recipient—both need time to retain an attorney, and the attorney 
needs time to draft a response. Unlike cease-and-desist letter recipients, 
however, litigation defendants have an opportunity to request additional 
response time from the court.69 Because the cease-and-desist letter process is 
extra-judicial, letter recipients do not have this ability. Therefore, a 
timeframe similarly given to litigating defendants, if not longer, is needed for 
the cease-and-desist letter process, and any letter demanding anything less 
than the standard twenty-one days should be considered abusive. 
3. Demands for Immediate Payment of Fees 
Similar to demanding settlement within a short timeframe, a demand 
for immediate payment of fees within a cease-and-desist letter is another 
factor that strongly favors characterizing the letter as abusive.70 The type of 
fees demanded differs depending on the particular claims. Some letters 
demand payment of licensing fees or attorneys’ fees, in addition to the target’s 
capitulation, in order for the sender to not file a lawsuit against the target. 
For example, the patent troll, MPHJ Technology, routinely sent cease-and-
desist letters to small businesses demanding a license fee between $900 and 
$1,200 per employee in order for the target to continue to use its scanning 
technology.71 In essence, the demand for fees in exchange for not filing a 
lawsuit is akin to extortion, particularly where the sender of the letter has no 
 
 67. For example, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) typically provides 
trademark and patent applicants with six months to respond to an office action (a letter from an 
attorney at the USPTO regarding the application). See MPEP § 710.01 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). While a request for additional time from the court may typically be 
made after the opposing party denies an extension, the ability to request the court for this additional 
time exists, and is not present in situations of cease-and-desist letters. 
 70. Also similar to the short time frame item, this item is also cited as a factor in determining 
a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in the recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws. See, 
e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703(2)(d) (West 2014). 
 71. See Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—For Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2, 
2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-
scanners/. 
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intention of filing a lawsuit.72 Some states recognize that extortion is 
actionable even where the threats are of unfounded civil prosecution.73 
4. Weak or Unreasonable Claims of Rights Violations 
“Weak” or “unreasonable” claims of rights violations are easy to 
identify at the extremes. For example, a claim alleging that a target had used 
the accuser’s trademarks to sell counterfeit products (but were, in fact, 
advertising the resale of genuine products), is a weak claim.74 Another 
example is a claim, which alleges trademark infringement by a company that 
began using the mark after the alleged infringer.75  
Where weak or unreasonable claims become harder to identify are 
borderline claims. These types of claims, at first, may appear mildly plausible, 
but after applying the target’s potential legal defenses, the claims become 
weak or even unreasonable.76 For example, Louis Vuitton sent a cease-and-
desist letter to the University of Pennsylvania School of Law (the “Law 
School”), claiming that a flyer publicizing the school’s symposium on Fashion 
Law infringed and diluted Louis Vuitton’s trademarks.77 The flyer’s 
background consisted of a design that was reminiscent of the famous “LV” 
logo, but had been changed to “TM” and “.”78 At first, Louis Vuitton’s 
claims seem plausible, as Louis Vuitton and the LV logo are famous 
trademarks, and the flyer’s background clearly intended to evoke a 
 
 72. See Extortion Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/extortion (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (“[T]he crime of 
obtaining money or some other thing of value by the abuse of one’s office or authority.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 113637 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
 74. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Micro Team, No. C 98-20164 PVT, 2000 WL 1897354, at 
*7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2000) (“Once the trademark holder sells his product, the buyer ordinarily 
may resell the product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability.”). 
 75. This is a weak claim because the alleged infringer would have “priority” under trademark 
law. Priority in trademark law is usually determined by which party first uses the mark in commerce. 
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015). 
 76. See Lara Pearson, Alex Butterman, Leah Chan Grinvald, Natalie Sulimani & Chris 
Wheeler, ‘Trademark Bullying’—Time to Get Some Clear Definitions, 44 WORLD TRADEMARK REV. 92, 
94 (Aug.Sept. 2013) (discussing the Louis Vuitton example). 
 77. See Letter from Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier, 
to Michael A. Fitts, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lv_letter.pdf. The language used in the 
letter is insulting: “I would have thought the Penn Intellectual Property group, and its faculty 
advisors, would understand the basics of intellectual property law and know better than to infringe 
and dilute the famous trademarks of fashion brands, including the LV Trademarks, for a 
symposium on fashion law.” Id. 
 78. See id. (including the flyer as Exhibit A). 
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connection to the brand since the symposium’s topic was fashion law.79 Due 
to this superficial plausibility, an Associate Dean at the Law School requested 
that the students immediately change the flyer.80 However, on closer 
inspection of both the letter’s claims and the Law School’s use of the LV logo, 
it became more apparent that neither a likelihood of confusion81 was present, 
nor was the Law School using the mark for a commercial purpose.82 After 
the Associate General Counsel of the Law School sent Louis Vuitton an 
explanation of its defenses, Louis Vuitton dropped its claim.83 
Asserting weak or unreasonable claims establishes a cease-and-desist 
letter as abusive because it takes advantage of the legal system, particularly 
when the sender knows its claims have little or no merit. In such situations, 
the sender is unlikely to file a lawsuit against the target, or if such lawsuit is 
filed, it is likely frivolous.84 To effectuate its demands, the sender depends on 
the target’s desire to avoid the stress of litigation (where the target is a well-
resourced entity), or the target’s fear and ignorance of litigation (where the 
target is a low-resourced entity, such as a small business or individual).85  
 
 79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of 
the mark’s owner.”). 
 80. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, to Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier (Mar. 2, 
2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/penn_ogc_letter.pdf 
(referencing the email sent by Steven Barnes, Associate Dean for Communications of the University 
of Pennsylvania Law School). 
 81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (“Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 
by such act.”). 
 82. See id. § 1125(c)(3) (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or 
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection . . . (C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.”). 
 83. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, supra note 80. 
 84. For example, the troll, MPHJ Technology, sent initial cease and desist letters to over 
16,000 small businesses from December 2012 to May 2013. See Joe Mullin, Patent Stunner: Under 
Attack, Nation’s Most Notorious “Troll” Sues Federal Gov’t, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/patent-stunner-under-attack-nations-most-
notorious-troll-sues-federal-govt/. After over a year of threats, MPHJ filed its first actual lawsuit in 
November 2013. See Joe Mullin, Notorious “Scan-to-Email” Patents Go Big, Sue Coca-Cola and Dillard’s, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/notorious-scan-to-
email-patents-go-big-sue-coca-cola-and-dillards/. 
 85. See Mullin, supra note 71 (reporting that one targeted company acceded to the demands 
of a patent troll without asking any questions in order to avoid conflict while it was in the process 
of being acquired). 
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Unfortunately, a number of incentives motivate senders to distribute 
abusive cease-and-desist letters.86 Where the targets of abusive cease-and-
desist letters are low-resourced entities, policy makers and the legal 
community should be concerned about the effectiveness of abusive cease-
and-desist letters causing numerous de facto coerced agreements, a reduction 
in marketplace competition, and an increase in private censorship of speech.  
II. Characteristics, Incentives, and Problems 
Some advocates of the private settlement process argue that resolving 
legal disputes without litigation is beneficial because it reflects the projected 
outcome of a judicial trial without imposing costs on society.87 Litigation is 
expensive, particularly in the intellectual property area.88 Therefore, as a 
theoretical matter, private settlements could be beneficial to society.89 
However, this is not the case in situations of asymmetrical disputants. The 
argument that a private settlement merely projects the outcome of litigation 
is premised on a faulty assumption of symmetrical bargaining power.90 
Disputes occur between and among parties of all sizes. Where there is 
economic or social disparity between the disputing parties, unregulated 
private settlements are likely to be considered coercive and not beneficial to 
society, as noted by Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss in his influential 
Comment entitled, “Against Settlement.”91 
Professor Fiss argues that three characteristics of low-resource litigants 
affect the settlement process, which increases the probability of settlement: 
(1) an inability to information-gather, (2) a susceptibility to inducement, and 
(3) an inability to finance the litigation.92 Due to these traits, Professor Fiss 
argues that private settlements are not appropriate because of the lack of 
 
 86. See infra Part II.B. 
 87. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe—And for 
the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996) (“The enforcement of legal rights consumes real resources, 
including . . . indirect costs to the extent that rights are enforceable against socially productive 
activities, or impose socially burdensome duties, or protect socially harmful activities.”). 
 88. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 3436 (2013) 
[hereinafter AIPLA 2013 REPORT] (reporting that in 2013, costs associated with intellectual 
property litigation ranged from $300,000 to $6,000,000, depending on the type of case and value). 
 89. See generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 
(1986) (discussing the externalities to society from private litigation). 
 90. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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judicial involvement in the process.93 Coupled with the incentives to send 
abusive cease-and-desist letters, low-resourced targets are left vulnerable to a 
coercive settlement process that begins with an abusive cease-and-desist 
letter. 
Coercion is considered an anathema in the law, and theoretically 
coerced settlements are recognized as ineffective manifestations of consent.94 
Practically, coerced settlements generated from abusive cease-and-desist 
letters are detrimental to society because they reduce market competition, 
and consequently, consumer choice.95 Additionally, abusive cease-and-desist 
letters chill free speech and provide private parties with a mechanism for 
censoring unfavorable speech.96 
A. Characteristics of Small Businesses and Individuals 
Although Professor Fiss’s Comment primarily focuses on the 
characteristics of low-resourced litigation plaintiffs, the same characteristics 
apply in the cease-and-desist letter process, where the concern is on low-
resourced targets, namely small businesses or individuals. As stated above, 
these two populations share the same characteristics that often lead to a quick 
settlement, regardless of the merits.97  
1. Inability to Information-Gather 
Information regarding the legal aspects of a dispute, such as the relevant 
laws and cases, is needed in order to effectively assess one’s chances of success 
in a legal dispute. Just as crucial, however, is the non-legal information 
regarding the opposing party, such as the resources of the other party and 
the party’s penchant for litigation. All of this information should be assessed 
together to formulate a strategy for the dispute (whether to send a demand 
 
 93. See id. at 107778. 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 292 (8th ed. 2006) (“It must, to constitute a contract, appear 
that two minds were at one . . . .”) (quoting Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463, 472 (1876)). 
 95. See Marcus Wohlsen, Patent Trolls are Killing Startups—Except When They’re Saving Them, 
WIRED (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/patent-trolls-versus-startups/ 
(reporting on the lawsuit filed by 1-800-Contacts against Ditto, a small startup competitor). See also 
infra Part II.C.2. 
 96. See Rebecca Curtin, SLAPPing Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can Learn from the 
Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author). 
 97. See infra Part II.C.3. 
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letter, bring or defend a lawsuit, settle, etc.).98 For example, a party with a 
strong legal claim facing an opponent without a litigious reputation should 
maintain a strong negotiating position. However, if the opposing party is 
litigious and well-resourced, then it may be more advantageous for the 
claimant to settle. But conducting effective information-gathering to obtain 
this information consumes resources, particularly, financial resources, of 
which a low-resourced entity likely has little.99 Therefore, upon receipt of a 
cease-and-desist letter, a small business or individual would likely make a 
relatively uninformed decision to merely comply with the letter’s demands.100 
2. Susceptibility to Inducement 
For small businesses and individuals, a cease-and-desist letter may not 
only be an ominous sign of expensive legal bills, but also an emotional 
firestorm. Over 78 percent of all small businesses in the United States are 
sole proprietors.101 This means that for the majority of small businesses, the 
only employee is the business owner herself.102 Based on this information, a 
cease-and-desist letter could be viewed as a personal attack on the business 
proprietor, rather than an impersonal business interaction. For example, one 
small business owner who received a cease-and-desist letter from the 
National Football League stated that the letter initially “scared the bejesus 
out of [her].”103 This leaves a small business or individual emotionally more 
susceptible to inducement to settle the legal dispute privately. 
3. Follow-through  
The appeals process is one aspect of the U.S. judicial system that 
increases the costs of litigation.104 Even if a party wins at the trial court level, 
 
 98. See Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 35 J. ASS’N 
LEGAL WRITING DIR. 32, 3637 (2008). 
 99. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 649. While some small businesses may have business 
insurance that could cover intellectual property infringement litigation, it is highly unlikely that 
individuals (such as bloggers or artists) would have insurance coverage for such claims. See id. at 649 
n.141. 
 100. See generally Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997) 
(providing examples an explanations regarding this asymmetrical information model). 
 101. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 654. 
 102. Id. at 65455. 
 103. Melinda Deslatte, ‘Who Dat’ Shirts CAN Be Sold: NFL Clarifies Saints Gear Position, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/01/who-dat-
shirts-can-be-sol_n_445291.html. 
 104. See Kim Tung, Reducing the Costs of Litigation: Appeals, PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., 
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there are generally two levels of appeals that the case could go through.105 
Even if a low-resourced entity is able to finance a lawsuit through the trial 
court proceeding, it may not be able to follow the case through on appeal. 
Additionally, once a lawsuit has begun, defendants at all stages have difficulty 
withdrawing without the consent of the plaintiff (which often comes at a high 
cost, if at all).106 Further, the consequences for not defending oneself are 
harsh—default judgment.107 This means that a low-resourced entity is likely 
to settle early, even if it has a strong defense, as it would be unlikely to have 
the funds to defend itself to the end of the litigation. 
Based on these three characteristics, Professor Fiss argues that private 
settlements between asymmetrical parties are inherently coercive and 
cautions against a wholesale adoption of rules that force parties to privately 
settle their legal disputes.108 This Article takes a more nuanced approach to 
private settlements between parties with resource disparity, and argues that 
the three characteristics place low-resourced entities at greater risk for 
coercive settlements. However, not all private settlements between unequal 
parties are necessarily coercive; instead, in the cease-and-desist letter process, 
it is the abusive letter combined with the asymmetry and the three 
characteristics that creates the coercion. The question then becomes one of 
why: Why would someone want to send an abusive letter? 
B. Incentives 
There are a number of economic, legal, and practical factors that 
incentivize entities to knowingly send abusive letters to small businesses and 
individuals. Four notable factors are (1) the costs of litigation and (2) its 
uncertainty, (3) the lack of legal consequences for sending abusive letters, and 
(4) the letter’s effectiveness in obtaining the desired outcome. 
 
http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/appeal.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). Tung’s 
article poses the questions: “What is wrong with the appellate system?” and “Why does it cost so 
much, but run so slowly?” See id. 
 105. See U.S. Court System, SYRACUSE UNIV. MAXWELL SCH. OF CITIZENSHIP & PUB. 
AFFAIRS, http://www2.maxwell.syr.edu/plegal/scales/court.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Even 
if the case is administrative, like an inter partes patent reexamination, the cost of seeing the case 
through to appeals is quite high, relative to the initial costs ($50,000 versus $250,000). AIPLA 2013 
REPORT, supra note 88, at 36. 
 106. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (“A defendant must serve an answer . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 107. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) (“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, 
the clerk must enter the party’s default.”). 
 108. Fiss, supra note 90, at 1075. 
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1. Costs of Litigation 
The economic costs of litigation have been widely discussed in academic 
and policy literature.109 Engaging in litigation is expensive and time-
consuming. For example, an average infringement lawsuit for a patent 
valued at less than $1 million costs $350,000 to $700,000 to litigate, without 
accounting for any appeals.110 Part of the expense of litigation is the time it 
takes from initiation to verdict.111 One empirical study of federal courts found 
that the average length of a civil lawsuit ranged from one to two years during 
the period of 197186.112 Generally, a sender of cease-and-desist letters is 
aware of these costs, as it is oftentimes a target itself.113 
For example, Intel is both a major enforcer of its intellectual property 
rights as well as a target of others’ enforcement efforts. Intel estimates that it 
receives between 100 and 150 cease-and-desist letters per month from patent 
holders claiming that it infringes on their rights.114 Due to the high costs of 
litigation, rights holders have a strong incentive to resolve disputes privately 
through cease-and-desist letters.115 While the costs of privately resolving an 
intellectual property rights dispute are unknown, it is likely much less 
expensive than litigation.116 Therefore, there is a high economic incentive for 
targets to settle immediately upon receiving a cease-and-desist letter. 
2. Uncertainty of Litigation  
In addition to the high costs of litigation, the uncertain outcome 
presented by many types of claims is another incentive to send cease-and-
desist letters. Particularly, litigation outcomes in intellectual property 
disputes are hard to predict, even for seasoned litigators. The reason for this 
difficulty differs for each area of intellectual property. For example, in patent 
 
 109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 87, at 2; Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell, Measuring 
The Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 37888 (1988); David M. 
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1993). 
 110. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 34. 
 111. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1990) (discussing the concern regarding caseload 
increases in federal district courts leading to delay and a consequent denial of justice to the parties). 
 112. Id. at 20. 
 113. See Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (discussing the following Intel example). 
 114. Id. (citing Intel’s General Counsel). 
 115. See FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, supra note 47, at 15 (listing intellectual property 
disputes as one of the most costly types of litigation). 
 116. See id. 
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cases, some of the uncertainty stems from the claim construction that the 
district court adopts during a “Markman” hearing,117 whereas in trademark 
law, the uncertainty can stem from the various defenses a defendant may 
have, or the strength of the plaintiff’s mark.118 Additionally, rights holders 
may be apprehensive about enforcing a claim in court due to the court’s 
ability to invalidate intellectual property rights.119 Similar to the high costs of 
litigation, outcome uncertainty incentivizes rights holders to ensure that they 
privately settle with the targets of their letters. 
3. Effectiveness  
While the empirical data on the effectiveness of abusive cease-and-desist 
letters is fairly non-existent, anecdotal evidence emphatically supports the 
conclusion that abusive letters are effective particularly when they are sent to 
low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals.120 The 
reason for such effectiveness is the confluence of factors discussed above—
the abusive language contained in the letter, asymmetrical disputants, and 
the characteristics of the low-resourced entities121—that creates a coercive 
 
 117. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“[W]e see the 
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to allocate 
all issues of construction to the court.”). See also Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary 
Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 104 (2005) (“The early interpretation 
of the scope of a patent claim can be used for subsequently deciding issues of both patent validity 
and infringement.”); David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes Early Victory Against Lowe’s, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW 
SCH. (June 4, 2014), http://www.suffolk.edu/news/52901.php (“[C]laim construction defines the 
scope of the patent and, in many cases, can greatly influence the ultimate outcome of the case.”). 
 118. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 638, 66061. The scope of trademark protection is based 
on the strength of the trademark. Id. at 638. The stronger the trademark is, the wiper scope of 
protection. Id.; see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(“The strength of a mark is determined by its placement on a ‘continuum of marks from “generic,” 
afforded no protection; through “descriptive” or “suggestive,” given moderate protection; to 
“arbitrary” or “fanciful” awarded maximum protection.’”) (quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-
Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1987)). Compare Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle 
Assocs., Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 54041 (3d Cir. 1964) (holding that the “Family Circle” trademark was 
not strong enough to enjoin unauthorized third-party uses in product categories other than in the 
plaintiff’s business of magazines), with The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 
1629, 1641–42 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that “Arden B” was a famous trademark and the plaintiff 
could enjoin third-party uses of the mark in product categories outside of plaintiff’s products). 
 119. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 
457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff’s trademark for its “Red Sole” was non-distinctive and 
ordering its cancellation), rev’d in part, 696 F.3d 206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (overturning the district 
court’s decision on non-distinctiveness, but limiting the trademark to where the Red Sole is 
contrasted with the outside color of the shoe). 
 120. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478. 
 121. See supra Parts I.B.14, II.A. 
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environment where the low-resourced entity has no choice but to accede to 
the demands of the cease-and-desist letter. It is important to note that abusive 
cease-and-desist letters are also effective when sent to well-resourced entities. 
This may be attributed to a number of factors, but for some well-resourced 
entities, the costs (financial and human capital) of engaging in litigation may 
outweigh any benefit obtained by receiving a favorable outcome.122 While 
abusive letters are problematic even if the disputants are in symmetry, this 
situation is not overly worrisome because there is no coercion. Well-
resourced parties are able to information-gather in order to make an 
informed decision to settle with an intellectual property rights holder.123 
4. Lack of Legal Consequences  
Due to its extra-judicial nature, abusive cease-and-desist letters do not 
come within the purview of the legal protections against abusive litigants, 
such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions.124 Outside 
of the judicial sphere, abusive cease-and-desist letters do not squarely fit 
within other regulatory schemes. One exception is where a patent troll sends 
an abusive letter in bad faith.125 This narrow situation directly implicates 
recent legislation passed by approximately twenty-two states, but as discussed 
in Part III.C, this legislation would not assist where the abusive letter was 
sent in good faith.126 
 
 122. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in Trademark and Unfair Competition 
Litigation, 2 LANDSLIDE 14, 17 (MayJune 2010) (concluding that since the possibility of attorneys’ 
fees may influence the decision to settle, attorneys need to take into consideration that attorneys’ 
fee awards are a low likelihood in trademark litigation). Willingness to settle is particularly the case 
in intellectual property law where judges have the discretion to impose attorneys’ fees on the losing 
party in “exceptional cases.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). Imposing attorneys’ fees is not the norm, 
and judges go out of their way to deny such awards. See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. 
Supp. 2d 685, 697 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (declining to award fees despite finding of willful infringement 
in context of award of statutory damages); Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 76 U.S.P.Q.D.2d 
(BNA) 1302, 1309 (D. Nev. 2004) (declining to award fees despite defendant’s continued 
infringement in violation of temporary restraining order), rev’d in part on other grounds, 452 F.3d 1126 
(9th Cir. 2006). See also Davis, supra, at 14. 
 123. Furthermore, a well-resourced party may be able to negotiate a coexistence agreement 
depending on the claims of the intellectual property rights holder. See Marianna Moss, Trademark 
“Coexistence” Agreements: Legitimate Contracts or Tools of Consumer Deception?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
197, 199 (2005) (“In order to coexist in the market ‘peacefully,’ companies with potentially 
infringing trademarks sometimes enter into coexistence agreements, which allow them to continue 
marketing their products to the public without the fear of defending a trademark infringement 
lawsuit.”). 
 124. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 125. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21. 
 126. See id. (identifying the following states as having passed legislation addressing bath faith 
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Aside from the narrow anti-patent troll laws, the only legal consequence 
for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters appears to be remote: the risk that 
the target files for a declaratory judgment action or publicly shames the 
sender. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a small business or individual will be 
able to file a declaratory judgment action against a sender of an abusive 
cease-and-desist letter due to the high costs involved.127 While public 
shaming is a low-cost alternative to litigation and can be an effective 
bargaining tool, a number of variables contribute to its success.128 Therefore, 
shaming may not be available to all targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
Additionally, recent work on prospect theory and the endowment effect 
shows that some senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters may not be 
rational actors, and, as a consequence, are likely unshamable.129 As a result, 
there are currently few, if any, direct legal consequences from sending an 
abusive cease-and-desist letter. While some forms of regulation could police 
abusive cease-and-desist letters, it is necessary to understand the problems 
associated with abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
C. Why are Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters Problematic? 
This Article has established that cease-and-desist letters may lead to 
coerced settlement agreements.130 Coercion is problematic on many different 
levels. Philosophically, coercion in a negotiation process invalidates any 
resulting agreement on moral grounds.131 However, due to the characteristics 
 
patent infringement assertions: Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). See, e.g., 
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-771(a) (West 2014) (“A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent 
infringement.”). 
 127. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 128. Some of these variables are shared norms of a community in which the target of shaming 
is a part, and the vulnerability to shaming by the shaming target. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 66668. 
 129. See Jessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understanding the Role of Uncertainty in Trademark 
Enforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 242 (2014) (“Calling the trademarks ‘crown 
jewels,’ or viewing them as on par with tangible property, illustrates the tendency of trademark 
owners to elevate the status of trademarks to something more significant than mere business assets. 
The inherent nature of trademarks lends itself easily to the errors associated with the endowment 
effect. Since this psychological effect can impact rational decision making, it should be taken into 
consideration by anyone seeking to deter trademark bullying.”). 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 131. See Claire Finkelstein, Contract Under Coercion: Should You Keep a Contract with a 
Robber? 3 (Sept. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Contracts_Under_Coercion_CFinkelstein_093010.pdf; 
Mark Fowler, Coercion and Practical Reason, 8 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 329, 330 (1982). 
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of low-resourced entities, it is unlikely that a coerced agreement would be 
invalidated—creating de facto enforcement. Economically, an agreement 
based on coercion is anti-competitive and reduces consumer choice in the 
marketplace. More generally, abusive cease-and-desist letters are 
problematic because they increase the power of private censorship by well-
resourced entities. 
1. Coercion Invalidates  
It is well-settled contract doctrine that coercion invalidates 
agreements.132 The theoretical rationale for this is that coercion clouds the 
free will and the thought process of the coerced party, such that the consent 
given is invalid.133 Under this reasoning, even if the choice made by the 
coerced party is advisable or intentional, the choice is still invalid because of 
the coerced party’s inability to freely decide that for herself.134 Abusive cease-
and-desist letters sent to small businesses and individuals are clearly coercive 
because the goal of an abusive letter is to cloud the free will and thought 
process of the low-resourced recipient. The use of unnecessary legalese and 
unsubstantiated statutory citations are intended to confuse and intimidate 
the non-attorney recipient of the letter. Additionally, the demand for 
immediate settlement within an unreasonable timeframe implies that no 
outside advisors would be allowed to provide support to the low-resourced 
entity. 
Further, the demands provided in the letter approximate extortion.135 
The threat of litigation, combined with one of the other indicia of 
abusiveness,136 provides the low-resourced entity with a choice of either 
complying or facing expensive litigation. This choice may come down to the 
decision between staying in business or the value received by keeping a secret 
 
 132. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 718 n.1 
(2005); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 61617 
(1943). 
 133. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 8 (1987) (“[C]oercion compromises or negates the 
voluntariness of an act . . . .”); Hale, supra note 132, at 616 (“[W]here there exist coercion . . . there 
is no volition. There is no intention nor purpose, but to yield to moral pressure, for relief from it.”). 
 134. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601 
(1944). 
 135. See David B. Parker & David D. Yang, Pre-Litigation Demand Letters: Assessing the Thin Line 
Between Zealous Advocacy and Extortion, 32 L.A. CNTY. BAR ASSOC. UPDATE, Dec. 2012, 
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=14413; Max Kennerly, When Does a Lawyer’s Demand 
Letter Become Extortion?, LITIGATION & TRIAL (July 19, 2013), 
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2013/07/articles/attorney/demand-letter-extortion/. 
 136. See supra Parts I.B.14. 
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safe. These options are not valid because the damage that could ensue from 
the expensive litigation is much greater than the perceived value of settling.  
Some critics may argue that a low-resourced target should simply enter 
into the coerced agreement and then subsequently bring a lawsuit to 
invalidate that agreement based on the coercion, such as in the seminal cases 
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.137 and Alaska Packers’ 
Ass’n v. Domenico.138 For example, in Totem Marine, the plaintiff had previously 
entered into a settlement agreement with Alyeska Pipeline in order to avoid 
bankruptcy. After it was able to financially stabilize itself, it brought a lawsuit 
against Alyeska Pipeline to invalidate the earlier agreement. However, this is 
not a viable option for many low-resourced entities. The inability of small 
businesses and individuals to follow through on litigation means that this 
population does not have the resources needed to defend or prosecute a civil 
lawsuit, and such legal action is needed in order to invalidate coerced 
settlement agreements. This inability results in a form of de facto 
enforceability, which should be viewed as morally and legally undesirable. 
2. Anti-Competitiveness  
Economically, abusive cease-and-desist letters sent to small businesses 
and individuals are anti-competitive and harms consumer choice. In the 
marketplace, it is often the small businesses and individuals who provide 
competition to the established businesses in any particular industry, often by 
offering cheaper or cutting-edge alternatives. For example, a dog toy 
company, Haute Diggity Dog, made chewable dog toys called “Chewy 
Vuiton,” that cost approximately $10, whereas the trademark holder, Louis 
Vuitton, sold dog accessories costing approximately $1,600.139 Additionally, 
individual bloggers that write product reviews or commentary aid small 
 
 137. 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978). In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., the plaintiff previously agreed to a 
settlement in return for a severe reduction in payment that was owed under the prior contract. Id. 
at 18. The plaintiff agreed to the settlement because they needed the quick infusion of cash, or else 
they would have gone bankrupt. Id. The court ruled that the settlement agreement had been 
coerced under the doctrine of economic duress and invalidated the agreement, paving the way for 
the plaintiff to potentially recover the full amount owed under the prior contract. Id. at 2325. 
 138. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Interestingly, the court in Alaska Packers’ Ass’n did not base its 
holding on the doctrine of coercion, but rather on the pre-existing duty rule. Id. at 103. However, 
the case has been re-explained by Professor Finkelstein in terms of coercion. See Finkelstein, supra 
note 131, at 4248. 
 139. See Peter Lattman, “Chewy Vuiton” Beats Louis Vuitton, But Feels a Bite, WALL ST. J. LAW 
BLOG (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/11/28/chewy-vuiton-beats-louis-vuitton-
but-feels-a-bite/; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 268 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
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businesses in increasing exposure and further facilitate marketplace 
competition.140 Cheaper, or different, products, and candid reviews are 
helpful to consumers, as they provide increased choice and information. 
The effectiveness of abusive cease-and-desist letters results in a 
reduction in competition, particularly where the letter alleges a violation of 
intellectual property rights. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are often 
embedded within a product or service. Where the abusive cease-and-desist 
letter requires a complete abstention of future production or sales of a 
product or service or alternatively pay an outrageous license fee, a low-
resourced entity may choose to simply discontinue the product. For example, 
the previously mentioned Haute Diggity Dog’s entire line of dog toys were 
parodies of famous trademarks. When Louis Vuitton sued them for 
trademark infringement, the small business defended itself because, 
otherwise, in the words of one employee, “we would have had to go out of 
business.”141 Unfortunately, even though practitioners acknowledge this anti-
competitive aspect of intellectual property enforcement, it is often not 
actionable or successful under antitrust law.142 
3. Private Censorship143  
A more general concern is the effect that abusive cease-and-desist letters 
have on the freedom of low-resourced entities to express themselves. One 
example involves the blog, kevynorr.com, which criticized the actions taken 
by Kevyn Orr, a former partner at the large law firm, Jones Day, in handling 
 
 140. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK 
LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 40910 (Graeme B. 
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008). 
 141. Lattman, supra note 139 (quoting a Haute Diggity Dog employee). 
 142. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 650 (stating that trademark bullying will not fall within the 
purview of antitrust law because a trademark is unlikely to generate market power, which is a main 
requirement for an antitrust cause of action). See also Michael Lipkin, Lens.com’s Antitrust Suit Against 
1-800 Contacts Dismissed, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/514963/lens-
com-s-antitrust-suit-against-1-800-contacts-dismissed (“U.S. District Judge David Sam dismissed 
Lens.com’s suit with prejudice, following the Tenth Circuit’s decision last year in a related case that 
1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims were not baseless.”). 
 143. While private censorship is not inherently unconstitutional due to the lack of state action, 
it is problematic in its own right. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 44449 (1990) (discussing the public versus private 
action distinction). Intellectual property law’s harmful effect on free speech has been the topic of 
extensive academic discussion and the full range of arguments is outside the scope of this Article. 
For more in-depth coverage see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 
TENN. L. REV. 1095, 116264 (2003); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 49 (2008); Ridgway, supra note 19, at 157178. 
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Detroit’s bankruptcy restructuring.144 The law firm sent the blog an abusive 
cease-and-desist letter with the intent to stop the negative criticism.145 Such 
criticism, while perhaps hurtful to Jones Day, serves an important function 
in our democratic society. Had the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-
profit organization, not stepped in to provide free legal counsel to the blog 
owners, it is likely that the criticism would have been taken down.146 More 
common, however, is for the low-resourced target to simply end its speech or 
censor itself ex ante. This results in an implicit authorization of private 
censorship, and where the targets are small businesses and individuals, 
regulation is clearly needed. 
III. Regulation of Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters? 
Although cease-and-desist letters are typically private, there are a 
number of regulations or statutes that could serve to police abusive letters. 
These include legal ethics rules, judicial protections against abusive litigants, 
state anti-patent troll legislation, and consumer protection laws.  
A. Legal Ethics Rules 
All attorneys have a unique responsibility to maintain the integrity and 
competence of the legal profession147 and are subject to the particular ethical 
rules established by the state where they are barred.148 Almost all states 
implement rules that closely resemble the American Bar Association’s (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,149 thus analyzing the applicability of 
 
 144. Joe Patrice, Biglaw Firm Throws Even Bigger Hissy Fit, ABOVE THE LAW (June 20, 2014), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/biglaw-firm-throws-even-bigger-hissy-fit/. 
 145. Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57; see also Daniel Nazer, EFF to Jones Day: 
Don’t be a Trademark Bully, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/eff-jones-day-dont-be-trademark-bully. 
 146. The blogger may have been coerced into taking down the site, as the cease-and-desist 
letter is very abusive. For example, it concludes with an ominous line, “Your conduct will be closely 
monitored.” Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57. The letter was also sent to the domain 
registrar and hosting service, GoDaddy.com. Id. Although GoDaddy.com has no legal obligation 
to take down the domain name, Jones Day may have hoped that GoDaddy.com believed it needed 
to take down the website to comply with the safe harbor for internet service providers under section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act. See Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications 
Decency Act, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-
publishers-under-communications-decency-act (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 147. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (2013). 
 148. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE 
METHOD 41 (2d ed. 1998). 
 149. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
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the Model Rules to policing cease-and-desist letters adequately reflects state 
ethics rules. These rules govern all aspects of an attorney’s professional 
conduct, covering behavior in interacting with a client, with the court, as well 
as with non-client parties. If a lawyer sends a cease-and-desist letter, Model 
Rules 3.1 and 4.4 should be implicated because both rules involve attorney 
interactions with a non-client.150 However, even if attorneys followed both 
rules, concerning ambiguities and gaps in regulation still exist. 
1. Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 Are Insufficient Policing Mechanisms 
a. Model Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claim and Contentions 
Model Rule 3.1 states, “A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, 
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for 
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”151 This rule could be 
interpreted to regulate cease-and-desist letters that contain extremely weak 
or meritless claims. If all attorneys adhered to this rule there would never be 
frivolous claims or lawsuits, but in reality, there is a widespread 
understanding that the rules of professional conduct do not effectively 
 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_p
rofessional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). For 
the Model Rules themselves, see Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Table of Contents, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_p
rofessional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
 150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013). There are a number of other Model Rules that could potentially also 
govern an attorney’s conduct in sending a cease-and-desist letter. For example, Paragraph 9 of the 
Preamble, Model Rule 3.4 titled Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, and Model Rule 4.1 
titled Truthfulness in Statements to Others. Paragraph 9 of the Preamble includes in a lawyer’s 
responsibility the duty to zealously represent one’s client but also maintain “a professional, 
courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, ¶ 9 (2013). However, an in-depth discussion of all of the Model Rules 
(including the Preamble) is outside the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will briefly analyze 
Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4, highlight the main problems with each rule, and discuss the shortcomings 
with attorney ethical rules overall as an effective policing mechanism for abusive cease-and-desist 
letters. 
Some states, like California, have additional rules that implicate communications between attorneys 
and non-clients. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5-100(a) (2013) (prohibiting California 
attorneys from threatening criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage 
in a civil dispute). Although Rule 5-100 applies to pre-litigation behavior, the rule does not cover 
abusive cease-and-desist letters that threaten civil litigation proceedings, as the rule only prohibits 
“criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges.” Id. 
 151. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013). 
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prevent attorneys from bringing meritless claims.152 Due to this, there are a 
number of other mechanisms that attempt to regulate attorney and litigant 
behavior, such as various provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
including Rule 11, which penalizes attorneys and litigants for bringing 
frivolous lawsuits.153 Additionally, Model Rule 3.1 does not prohibit sending 
an abusive cease-and-desist letter if it contains some legally meritorious 
claims.154 As such, there are other concerns with abusive cease-and-desist 
letters, for example, utilizing unnecessary legalese or demanding a settlement 
within a short timeframe, which the Model Rules do not address. 
b. Model Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons  
The title of Model Rule 4.4, “Respect For Rights Of Third Persons,”155 
would seem to closely address the concern of preventing abusive cease-and-
desist letters. The text of Model Rule 4.4(a) states, “In representing a client, 
a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to 
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining 
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”156 However, the 
problem with abusive letters is that their substantial purpose is to stop the 
infringing actions through coercion, with the threats of embarrassment as a 
means to obtain the desired settlement. Furthermore, two of the three 
comments to Model Rule 4.4 appear to focus the rule on the gathering of 
evidence;157 therefore, the meaning of the term “burden” could be 
interpreted as meaning burdensome discovery requests, rather than sending 
abusive letters. 
2. Additional Concerns: Partisanship, Enforcement and 
Coverage 
Notwithstanding the identified gaps in each of the Model Rules, even if 
the rules could theoretically prevent almost all instances of abusive letters 
sent by attorneys, there are at least three additional concerns that prevent 
the Model Rules from being entirely effective: partisanship, enforcement, 
and coverage. 
 
 152. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 
89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing multiple instances where attorneys filed meritless claims). 
 153. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also infra Part III.B.2. 
 154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013). 
 155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. r. 4.4 cmts. 23. 
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a. Partisanship  
The first concern is with an attorney’s ability to identify violations of the 
ethical rules. Professor Andrew Perlman’s recent article on “partisanship,” 
or the assumption that lawyers are capable of being affiliated with one side 
of the matter while remaining sufficiently objective about their own conduct, 
persuasively shows that an attorney’s objective self-analysis as to whether she 
is following the ethical rules is distorted.158 For example, where an attorney 
discovers documents that would be extremely detrimental to her client’s case, 
that attorney may not disclose those documents and further, may not believe 
she has crossed the ethical line. Professor Perlman’s article suggests that 
attorneys may believe that they are following the rules, but in fact are not, 
due to a lack of objectivity.159 In the above example, the attorney may believe 
that she is acting as a “zealous” and ethical advocate due to her lack of 
objectivity. The concern with partisanship is that attorney ethical rules are 
mostly enforced through self-regulation. This means attorneys themselves 
are in charge of deciding when they are following the rules and will have a 
difficult time determining whether they are complying in situations where 
the legal standard (e.g., the meaning of a “meritless” cease-and-desist letter) 
is unclear. Additionally, attorneys have a duty to report ethical infractions of 
other attorneys.160 The threat of being reported is assumed to have a 
deterrent effect and limit unethical practices.161 But Professor Perlman’s 
article casts serious doubt on this assumption, as unethical conduct is likely 
to go undetected.162 
b. Enforcement  
The second concern is enforcement of the rules because enforcement is 
 
 158. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript at 3). 
 159. Id. 
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (2013) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authority.”). 
 161. See generally Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The Two 
Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
201 (2009) (conducting empirical study into the ethical and legal compliance of lawyers and their 
clients). 
 162. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 1622 (providing examples of studies showing that biases 
tend to cloud attorney’s recognition of unethical conduct). 
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primarily through self-regulation.163 The implications of partisanship are that 
another attorney receiving an abusive cease-and-desist letter may not 
recognize the letter as abusive.164 Notwithstanding partisanship, due to the 
characteristics of small businesses and individuals, it is unlikely that this 
population would have access to legal resources to assist them in identifying 
abusive behavior. Additionally, even where abusive behavior is identified by 
low-resourced entities, knowledge of how and where to report attorney 
conduct is confusing. State bar associations do conduct a certain amount of 
outreach education to local communities about attorney ethical behavior and 
attempt to ease the burden of reporting by maintaining online reporting 
systems.165 However, additional assistance is needed. 
c. Coverage  
Finally, another concern of relying solely on the Model Rules to police 
abusive cease-and-desist letters is that they do not cover letters sent by non-
attorneys. Although attorneys send the majority of cease-and-desist letters on 
behalf of their clients, there are certain instances when non-attorneys send 
letters. For example, the Chairman of Eastern Point Trust Company, a non-
depository trust company, sent a cease-and-desist letter to Mr. Money 
Mustache, a financial advice blogger, alleging tortious business interference, 
conversion, trade disparagement, defamation, trademark, and copyright 
violations made by a post on its website.166 The contents of the letter are 
abusive because it threatens to pursue litigation with an extremely weak legal 
claim if the demands are not met within five days.167 The Model Rules would 
 
 163. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 10 (2013). 
 164. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 3132 (discussing the issue of “ethical fading,” which are 
blind spots, particularly in light of the structures of modern law firms). 
 165. See, e.g., Lawyer Regulation, CAL. STATE BAR, http://calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys 
/LawyerRegulation.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Resolving Conflict With a New York Attorney: A Guide 
to Attorney Disciplinary Procedures in New York State, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org 
/CustomTemplates/SecondaryStandard.aspx?id=26561 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Client-Attorney 
Assistance Program (CAAP), TEX. STATE BAR, http://www.texasbar.com/Content/NavigationMenu 
/ForThePublic/ProblemswithanAttorney/CAAP/default.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); File a 
Complaint Against a Lawyer, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-
Lawyer-Conduct/Discipline/File-a-Complaint-Against-a-Lawyer (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
 166. Letter from Glen Armand, Chairman, Eastern Point Trust Co., to 
MrMoneyMustache.com (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.mrmoneymustache.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/kisstrust_first_bullshit_letter.jpg. 
 167. Id.; see also Tim Cushing, Company Fires Off Legal Threats To Site Owner Over Third-Party Forum 
Post; Self-Inflicted Damage Ensues, TECHDIRT (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.techdirt.com/articles 
/20140313/07405826562/company-fires-off-legal-threats-to-site-owner-over-third-party-forum-
post-self-inflicted-damage-ensues.shtml (discussing the tenuousness of the letter’s claims). 
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not cover this letter because the Chairman is not a licensed attorney.168 
Additionally, it is popular for large intellectual property rights holders to have 
brand managers, typically non-attorneys, manage the enforcement of their 
trademark portfolio.169 While brand managers may work in concert with an 
attorney to draft a standard cease-and-desist letter, a non-attorney brand 
manager is not bound by any ethical rules. Thus, even if Model Rules 3.1 
and 4.4 were effective in policing abusive cease-and-desist letters sent by 
attorneys, these rules would not cover all abusive letters. 
B. Judicial Protection Against Abusive Litigants 
The sender of an abusive cease-and-desist letter is similar to an abusive 
litigant in that the sender is attempting to utilize the legal system to coerce 
the target into yielding to its demands. As such, two forms of protection 
against abusive litigants, the potential for declaratory judgment actions and 
sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, could apply to 
situations of abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
1. Declaratory Judgment Actions 
A declaratory judgment action allows the recipient of a cease-and-desist 
letter to file a lawsuit against the sender seeking to resolve any legal 
uncertainty.170 This allows targets to potentially resolve the controversy 
raised by cease-and-desist letters faster because they do not have to wait to 
see whether or not the sender brings the threatened lawsuit.171 Depending 
on the type of legal violation stated in the cease-and-desist letter, this 
procedure is a valuable way to “clear the air” and move forward with one’s 
 
 168. See Cushing, supra note 167 (reporting that Glen Armand is not an attorney). 
 169. Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 
1491, 1529 (2012). 
 170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . 
any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested 
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”). 
 171. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 43, 45 (2010) (stating that declaratory relief in patent cases are effective because 
the alleged infringer chooses the forum and controls the timing of suit). See also R. Scott Weide, 
Patent Enforcement Deterrence: Liberal Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 65 
UMKC L. REV. 177, 177 (1996) (“In many instances, the filing of a declaratory judgment action 
gives the alleged infringer a significant strategic advantage over the patent owner.”); Homer Yang-
hsien Hsu, Neutralizing Actual Controversy: How Patent Holders Can Reduce the Risk of Declaratory Judgment 
in Patent Disputes, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 93, 96 (2010) (“The advantages of declaratory 
judgments for alleged patent infringers are many.”). 
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business or life.172 Due to this ability, as well as the central role intellectual 
property plays in some businesses’ products, declaratory judgment actions 
are frequently sought in patent disputes.173 
However, the problem with declaratory judgment actions is that it is still 
a judicial procedure that comes with the commensurate time and expense of 
litigation.174 This means that the characteristics of small businesses and 
individuals will continue to hinder this group of disputants with an inability 
to follow through with litigation, and it is unlikely that this population would 
be able to bring a declaratory judgment action. Unlike in a regular lawsuit 
where a plaintiff may be able to find a contingency-fee attorney, it is unlikely 
that a plaintiff’s attorney firm would be willing to take a target’s declaratory 
judgment case because the target is the one that is claimed to be in the wrong. 
Further, even if a small business or individual has business insurance that 
covers defending an action, the insurance policy would likely require the 
small business or individual to wait until the plaintiff initiates a legal action 
in order to pay for the defense.175 
 
 172. See Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & Bargaining Breakdown: When is Declaratory Relief 
Needed?, 64 SMU L. REV. 895, 899900 (2011) (noting importance of declaratory relief to potential 
infringers because of substantial damage awards); Tejas N. Narechania, An Offensive Weapon?: An 
Empirical Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1574, 1590 (2010) (“[D]eclaratory judgment actions serve an important role in the intellectual 
property system . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); Marta R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now 
Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International 
Co., 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 384 (2010) (“Congress enacted the Declaratory 
Judgment Act to eliminate uncertainty in situations where one of the parties threatens to sue but 
does not proceed. . . . Congress was especially mindful of the problems presented in patent, 
trademark, and copyright infringement cases.”). 
 173. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1464 (2010) (stating that in all 
jurisdictions outside of the Eastern District of Texas declaratory judgments accounted for 15.49% 
of patent suits filed in 2005). See also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic 
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 921 (2001) (stating that declaratory judgments brought 
by the infringer accounted for 14% of all tried cases in the dataset). Additionally Professor Megan 
La Belle’s research in the area shows a close link between the Declaratory Judgment Act and patent 
litigation. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 6061 (2012). 
 174. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory 
Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn’t 
Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 53132 (1989) (“A declaratory judgment action is designed to 
permit a party to obtain an ‘authoritative judicial statement of the legal relationships,’ regardless of 
whether a coercive legal or equitable remedy is sought.”) (quoting Frank M. Gilliland, Jr., Note, 
Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830 
(1951)). 
 175. Eliot M. Harris, The Duty to Defend: What Insurers, Insureds and Their Counsel Need to Know 
When Faced with a Liability Coverage Dispute, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org 
/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/duty.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015). Most business insurance policies contain a “duty to defend,” which protects the insurance 
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2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
A number of Rules of Civil Procedure at both the state and federal level 
could potentially regulate abusive cease-and-desist letters.176 For example, 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intends to prevent attorneys 
and their clients from bringing frivolous lawsuits.177 Where there is a 
violation of Rule 11, either the court or a litigant may bring a motion to 
sanction another litigant or their attorney.178 However, the problem with 
relying on Rules of Civil Procedure to police abusive cease-and-desist letters 
is that courts cannot impose sanctions until the litigation reaches the judicial 
system. For example, Rule 11 only authorizes sanctions against attorneys or 
their clients for representations made in court filings.179 As mentioned earlier, 
the cease-and-desist letter process is mainly extra-judicial, and therefore, a 
judge would never be involved to sanction the sender of an abusive cease-
and-desist letter. Additionally, even where litigation arises based on an 
abusive cease-and-desist letter, it is likely that an abusive letter would still not 
be subjected to regulation by Rule 11, as it is not a court filing, but rather a 
private communication between the parties sent prior to litigation.180 
C. State Anti-Patent Troll Legislation 
The problems concerning abusive cease-and-desist letters and abusive 
litigation in the patent area received national attention a few years ago with 
the increase in what has been termed as “patent troll” litigation.181 The term 
“patent troll” refers to the practice of some business entities of purchasing 
patents without the intention of practicing the invention contained within the 
 
policyholder in cases where a lawsuit is filed against her, not the other way around. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.160 (West 2015). 
 177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 178. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). However, only attorneys can be sanctioned for violations of Rule 
11(b)(2), which requires an attorney certifies that the “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A). 
 179. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 180. See id. Sometimes abusive cease-and-desist letters are entered into evidence in a civil 
litigation, but oftentimes it is simply to buttress a claim of notice or to fight against personal 
jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. See Athletic Training Innovations, LLC v. L.A. Gear, 
Inc., No. 10-1524, 2010 WL 4103309, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that an abusive cease-
and-desist letter, when sent to plaintiff and its customers, supports a finding of personal jurisdiction 
over defendant). Additionally, even where senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters are subject to 
judicial scrutiny, the likelihood of a judge issuing sanctions is fairly slim. Manta, supra note 7, at 860. 
 181. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 32728 (2012). 
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patent (also referred to as non-practicing entities or patent assertion 
entities).182 Instead, the reason for purchasing the patent is to simply enforce 
its rights against unauthorized users to extract licensing fees.183 Although 
patent law implicitly authorizes entities having no intention to practice the 
invention to acquire patents, this form of patent enforcement became 
problematic when patent trolls began filing multiple lawsuits against targets, 
clogging up the court dockets.184 However, it was not until patent trolls began 
to target small businesses and individuals that the problem reached executive 
and legislative attention.185 
A number of different bills were introduced in Congress to combat the 
problem of patent trolls, but all have been stalled.186 In response to the 
congressional inaction, a wave of “anti-patent troll” legislation began to take 
hold at the state level in 2013. As of the date of this Article, there are 
approximately twenty-two states with this type of legislation.187 Each state’s 
legislation differs slightly, but at the core of each statute is a prohibition on 
 
 182. Id.; see also Colleen Chien, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing of PAEs: Patent 
Assertion Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314. Not all non-practicing entities (NPEs) purchase their patent 
portfolio. Some NPEs, like universities, have organic patent portfolios from their research 
departments. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 61214 (2008) (answering the title’s question in the negative, and terming 
universities as non-practicing entities). 
 183. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117, 212627 (2013) (describing these entities as “patent aggregators”). 
 184. See Chien, supra note 182 (finding that in 2012, patent assertion entities filed 61% of all 
patent infringement lawsuits). 
 185. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that small businesses are frequent 
targets of patent troll demand letters); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 461, 46465 (2014) (finding that 40% of small businesses had been targets of patent troll cease-
and-desist letters for using technology provided by another party); Catching Up on . . . Innovatio IP 
Ventures, LLC’s Litigation Activities, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/01/catching-up-on-innovation-ip-ventures-llcs-litigation-
activities/ (reporting on Innovatio’s use of Broadcom’s patents to sue businesses such as restaurants, 
coffee shops, hotels, and grocery stores that use wireless internet). 
 186. See Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-
reform-legislation/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015); Joe Mullin, Anti-Patent-Troll Bill Stalls in Senate, But 
Reformers Remain Hopeful, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2104), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/04/anti-patent-troll-bill-stalls-in-senate-but-reformers-remain-hopeful/. However, 
none of the bills attempt to address letters sent by patent trolls, just litigation behavior. See, e.g., 
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 299A (2015) (proposing to add a new section to the Patent 
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299A, that recognizes the abusiveness of demand letters, but does not sanction the 
letters themselves rather the litigation stemming from such letters). 
 187. See Patent Progress’s Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21 (providing an interactive 
map of states with different stages of anti-patent troll bills). 
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sending a bad faith assertion of patent infringement through cease-and-desist 
letters.188 Determining a “bad faith assertion” is factor-based, and each 
statute contains similar factors, such as lack of disclosure of the patent in the 
letter (or failure to provide the information once requested), and demands 
for payment.189 While these statutes are a step in the right direction, their 
applicability is limited to bad faith claims of patent infringement. Therefore, 
state laws only provide limited coverage, and would not prohibit abusive 
cease-and-desist letters containing claims of other types of violations. 
Additionally, the text of the statutes contains limitations.190 For example, 
some statutes, like those in Wisconsin, focus on the disclosures contained in 
the cease-and-desist letter, rather than on the abusiveness of the demands.191 
This means that savvy senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters can easily 
escape any legal consequences by complying with the statute’s disclosure 
provisions. 
D. Consumer Protection Law 
A final potential source of regulation for abusive cease-and-desist letters 
is federal and state consumer protection law because sending abusive cease-
and-desist letters can constitute an unfair and/or deceptive trade practice. At 
the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the authority 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act to bring enforcement actions 
against entities conducting unfair and/or deceptive trade practices.192 At the 
state level, each state attorneys general office enforces the state’s version of 
 
 188. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703 (West 2014). The state statutes refer to the cease-
and-desist letter as a “demand” letter. Some of the statutes provide a definition of a “demand” letter 
to include a “letter, email or other communication asserting or claiming that the target has engaged 
in patent infringement.” See, e.g., id. § 48-1702. 
 189. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1903 (West 2014). In addition, many states include 
discretion for the court to consider other factors when determining the bad faith nature of the patent 
infringement claim. See id. But see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2014) (“A patent notification 
shall contain all of the following . . . . If a patent notification lacks any of the information required . . . 
the target may notify the person who made the patent notification that the patent notification is 
incomplete.”) (emphasis added). 
 190. A systemic review of the state laws are beyond the scope of this Article. For coverage of 
all forms of patent reforms, see ANDREW S. BALUCH, PATENT REFORM 2014: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO CURRENT PATENT REFORM DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGRESS, THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH, THE COURTS AND THE STATES (Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/4969911f-42ea-4566-90c9-3fa620d12f91/Presentation 
/PublicationAttachment/6ec9626b-2190-4a11-9d51-425adec351f0/PatentReform2014.pdf. 
 191. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2014). 
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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the “unfair and deceptive practices” act.193 Some abusive cease-and-desist 
letters come under the ambit of consumer protection laws, particularly where 
they contain deceptive statements or false threats of litigation.194 In fact, 
recent enforcement actions taken by the FTC and the Attorneys General of 
New York, Nebraska, and Vermont, against the “scanner troll,”195 MPHJ 
Technology Investments, LLC, shows the ability of consumer protection laws 
to regulate the senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters.196 
However, a severe limitation of utilizing consumer protection laws as 
the sole means to police abusive cease-and-desist letters is that few letters will 
meet the criteria for enforcement efforts by the FTC or a state attorney 
general. The reason the FTC and a state attorney general could take action 
against MPHJ Technology was because of the extreme number of small 
businesses it threatened, and the deceptiveness it used in attempting to coerce 
license fees.197 But other well-known patent trolls, such as Innovatio, have 
escaped similar FTC and state attorneys general enforcement actions despite 
undertaking actions similar to MPHJ Technology, but not in the same 
deceptive manner.198 Therefore, where senders of abusive cease-and-desist 
letters sufficiently disclose their claims and do not target thousands of small 
 
 193. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE 
REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (Feb. 2009), available at 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. 
 194. Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n on Discussion Draft of Patent Demand Letter Legislation 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 34 (May 22, 
2014) (statement of Lois Greisman, Assoc. Dir. Div. Mktg. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n) 
[hereinafter Statement of Lois Greisman]. 
 195. See Samuels, supra note 38 (describing MPHJ technology as the “scanner troll”). 
 196. See Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-170, 2014 WL 1494009 
(D. Vt. Apr. 15, 2014); MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 6:14-cv-11, 
2014 WL 189831 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014) (initiating a lawsuit against FTC for its investigations 
of MPHJ); Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215, 2014 WL 197808 (D. 
Neb. Jan. 14, 2014); N.Y. Press Release, supra note 13. 
 197. MPHJ utilized a dizzying array of shell companies to represent itself, leaving the target 
unable to speak to a person about the claims contained in the abusive letters. See MPHJ Tech. 
Investments, LLC, 2014 WL 1494009, at *12 (describing the process by which MPHJ operated). 
 198. Innovatio, or the “wifi patent troll,” sent numerous abusive cease-and-desist letters to 
small businesses for infringement of its wifi patents. Daniel Nazer, Infamous Wi-Fi Patent Troll Settles 
for Peanuts, TROLLING EFFECTS (Feb. 7, 2014), https://trollingeffects.org/blog/infamous-wi-fi-
patent-troll-settles-peanuts. Attempting to protect its customers, Cisco and a number of other 
equipment manufacturers brought an action against Innovatio alleging RICO (fraud and 
racketeering) conspiracy. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig., No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012 
WL 8500139, ¶ 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012). Cisco’s RICO claims were dismissed and it eventually 
settled with Innovatio for 3.2 cents per user. See Thomas F. Cotter, Judge Holderman’s RAND Ruling 
in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Oct. 3, 
2013), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2013/10/judge-holdermans-rand-
ruling-in-in-re.html. 
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businesses in any one particular state, the senders will likely escape legal 
liability. 
In conclusion, there does not appear to be any one regulatory 
mechanism that fits the concerns posed by abusive cease-and-desist letters. 
The Model Rules potentially come the closest, but gaps in protection still 
exist within the rules, and they also do not cover all senders of abusive cease-
and-desist letters. Additionally, without a serious threat of enforcement, the 
rules themselves cannot be effective. Moreover, although the recently 
enacted state anti-patent troll laws are a step in the right direction, they are 
too narrow in scope as they specifically attempt to cover abusive patent cease-
and-desist letters. Further, actions taken by the FTC and state attorneys 
general against MPHJ Technology under consumer protection laws are 
another potential avenue for regulation, but currently the actions appear to 
be limited to extreme situations where the sender conducts a deceptive and 
widespread enforcement campaign. Finally, a more theoretical concern with 
each of the various forms of potential regulation is that they do not address 
any of the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that contribute 
to the coercive settlement process. Therefore, mechanisms need to be 
implemented that could better assist with policing abusive cease-and-desist 
letters that specifically target the characteristics of this vulnerable population. 
IV. Proposals to Police Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters 
This Article’s proposals attempt to attack the problem of abusive cease-
and-desist letters from both sides of the dispute, sender and target, with the 
goal of creating a non-coercive settlement environment for small businesses 
and individuals. First, on the sender side, the proposals attempt to reduce the 
incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters by altering the incentives that 
create an environment ripe for abusive letters. Second, on the target side, the 
proposals aim to provide mechanisms that assist small businesses and 
individuals in overcoming the characteristics that leads to a coercive 
settlement process in asymmetrical disputes. While none of the proposals 
individually are a panacea for the problems of abusive cease-and-desist 
letters, they are an important first step in encouraging the serious and non-
coercive enforcement of legal rights. 
A. Legislative Action 
The first proposal is for Congress and/or states to provide a new cause 
of action for “abusive threats” similar in nature to the previously discussed 
state anti-patent troll laws, as well as borrowing some procedural advantages 
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from state anti-SLAPP laws.199 Before discussing the elements of this new 
cause of action, it is important to note the objectives of this proposal and its 
limitations. The objectives of this proposal are to reduce the incidences of 
abusive cease-and-desist letters and assist small businesses and individuals. 
The goal is not to hamper good faith efforts to enforce valid legal rights, but 
rather, to provide a non-coercive and more equalized platform for parties of 
all sizes to enforce their rights and negotiate a fair settlement. Providing a 
new cause of action for abusive threats would accomplish this goal in two 
ways. 
First, the cause of action attacks the incentives that rights holders have 
to send abusive cease-and-desist letters. As discussed in Part II, the major 
incentives for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters include a lack of legal 
consequences for the action, and the letter’s effectiveness in obtaining the 
desired outcome. Without any real possibility of legal consequences, rights 
holders are incentivized to send abusive letters because they are low in cost. 
It is more rational for a sender to first send an abusive cease-and-desist letter, 
and then subsequently analyze whether actually pursuing litigation would be 
advantageous. Implementing a cause of action for abusive threats that carries 
serious financial risks for the sender of an abusive letter creates the possibility 
for greater accountability and would likely result in rights holders 
recalibrating their enforcement tactics. 
Second, the anti-abusive threats law would attack two of the three 
characteristics that cripple small businesses and individuals in an abusive 
cease-and-desist letter process: the inability to information-gather and 
susceptibility to inducement. This would be done by providing small 
businesses and individuals the ability to recover damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
legal costs. These remedies would allow small businesses or individuals to 
more easily retain attorneys on a contingency fee basis.200 With an ability to 
retain an attorney, a low-resourced target of an abusive letter would be able 
to information-gather because the attorney would advise the small business 
or individual on the strength of the claims contained within the letter, as well 
as the target’s relative rights. While an attorney may still advise the low-
resourced target that a settlement is preferable,201 the decision would be 
 
 199. See supra Part III.C. See generally Curtin, supra note 96. 
 200. Contingency fee arrangements assist low-resourced entities in obtaining legal 
representation. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency 
Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 243 (1998). 
 201. For example, when Matt Nadau of RockArt Brewery (a small brewery in Vermont) faced 
a potential legal battle with Hansen Beverages, his lawyer explained the risks of fighting back against 
a large corporation and ultimately advised him to settle. See Matt vs. The Monster—2011 Bronze Telly, 
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informed, rather than one made through coercion. Additionally, an attorney 
could curb some of the emotional inducement frequently experienced by 
low-resourced targets through counseling and education. 
However, this cause of action would not be a panacea to the problems 
associated with the abusive cease-and-desist letter. For example, the new law 
would not attack the systemic problem of expensive litigation. Similarly, the 
new law would not cover the general over-enforcement of legal rights by 
Americans and, in particular, by U.S. intellectual property rights holders.202 
Instead, this new law will provide modest and incremental assistance to low-
resourced targets. 
Although this Article does not suggest specific language for the proposed 
cause of action, it does take the position that developing a cause of action 
should be enacted statutorily, rather than solely through the courts. The need 
for uniformity and certainty in the law support this position. In recent years, 
judges have become more “textualist” with respect to interpreting statutes 
and defenses to violations, particularly with respect to federal intellectual 
property laws.203 If a cause of action or defense is not explicitly stated within 
the statute, textualist judges would likely rule against the claimant.204 Further, 
certainty that a court accepts suits brought by targets of abusive cease-and-
desist letters would assist in making contingency fee attorneys feel more 
comfortable that their client would not face an uphill battle. 
This Article broadly envisions three elements to bring an “anti-abusive 
threats” cause of action: (1) there is an allegation of a legal rights violation; 
(2) that is abusive; (3) made to a specific target. All of these elements would 
need to be met within the first cease-and-desist letter sent to the target in 
order for the letter to be actionable. This limitation should assist in protecting 
good faith enforcers of legal rights who encounter targets that attempt to 
provoke abuse.205 However, standing to bring this cause of action should not 
 
GREEN RIVER PICTURES, http://www.grpny.com/index.php/about-us 
/awards?videoid=41738861 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 202. Over-enforcement is a problem of private enforcement of legal rights by intellectual 
property rights holders, and is the topic of separate research by this Article’s author, along with co-
authors Eric Goldman and Deborah Gerhardt. 
 203. See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” 
Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 927 (2009). 
 204. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that despite 
a compelling policy argument, the court would not recognize the “famous marks doctrine” in 
trademark law because it was not explicitly written into federal trademark law). 
 205. For example, David Thorne, a comedian and author, provokes abusive behavior by 
publishing his emails and letters in books and on his website. See generally DAVID THORNE, THE 
INTERNET IS A PLAYGROUND: IRREVERENT CORRESPONDENCES OF AN EVIL ONLINE GENIUS 
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only be limited to the recipients of the abusive letter, but by any person who 
is aggrieved by such a letter.206  
1. Allegation of Legal Rights Violation  
One of the deficiencies identified in Part III.C with respect to the 
recently enacted anti-patent troll legislation was that the laws only dealt with 
bad faith claims of patent infringement. However, abusive letters claiming 
legal rights violations occur across all areas of the law. For example, a 
number of cases in California courts concerning abusive letters deal with the 
misuse of company funds and prior sexual conduct.207 Aside from the 
political and media attention that “patent trolls” have garnered, there does 
not appear to be a reason as to why other types of intellectual property rights 
or other legal rights are exempt from the requirement of good-faith 
enforcement.208 
2. Abusive Letter  
Determining abusiveness is challenging, as is seen from the discussions 
 
(2011); 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). Mr. Thorne received a 
cease-and-desist letter from Penguin Books Ltd. (the publisher of his first book) for the artwork 
displaying a penguin with its finger raised printed on the cover of his second book. See Dennis 
Johnson, Penguin is Not Amused, MELVILLE HOUSE (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.mhpbooks.com 
/penguin-is-not-amused/. As can be seen from the series of emails and letters, Mr. Thorne is 
purposefully provocative. Penguin, 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/covers.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015). 
 206. This is similar to the United Kingdom’s remedy for groundless threats of infringement 
proceedings. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 70(1) (Eng.) (“Where a person . . . threatens another 
person with proceedings for any infringement of a patent, a person aggrieved by the threats 
(whether or not he is the person to whom the threats are made) may . . . bring proceedings in the 
court against the person making the threats.”); Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(1) (Eng.) (“Where 
a person threatens another with proceedings for infringement of a registered trade mark . . . any 
person aggrieved may bring proceedings for relief under this section.”); Registered Designs Act, 
1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 88, § 26(1) (Eng.) (“Where any person . . . threatens any other person 
with proceedings for infringement of the copyright in a registered design, any person aggrieved 
thereby may bring an action against him.”); Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 
253(1) (Eng.) (“Where a person threatens another person with proceedings for infringement of 
design right, a person aggrieved by the threats may bring an action against him.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Malin v. Singer, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (involving 
allegations of embezzlement); Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2006) (involving allegations of 
sexual misconduct). 
 208. Patent trolls have garnered national attention, whereas other abusers of legal rights have 
not, such as copyright trolls and trademark bullies. However, the harms caused by these other types 
of abusers are similar in nature to patent trolls. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 
100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2015). 
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surrounding the abusive letters in California referenced above.209 Although 
multi-factor tests are often problematic,210 this Article favors a non-exclusive 
factor approach in discerning abusiveness to give courts an appropriate 
amount of discretion. Additionally, the non-exclusive factor approach allows 
for changes in social norms that necessarily inform this type of analysis. The 
factors specified in Part I.B are examples of non-exclusive factors that could 
be adopted to determine when a cease-and-desist letter is abusive, but other 
factors may be relevant, depending on the type of legal claim asserted.211 
Finally, only the first communication sent to the target would be examined 
for abusiveness. This limitation would safeguard against targets that attempt 
to utilize the new cause of action to goad the legal rights holder into sending 
an abusive letter. A number of well-resourced individuals enjoy provoking 
rights holders to see if they become abusive out of frustration.212 
3. Made to a Target  
This last element is worded broadly in order to afford many different 
types of targets standing to sue an abusive sender. Senders can target a wide 
range of different entities other than the alleged violator, such as the alleged 
violator’s customers, distribution network, or supply chain.213 At times, it 
may be more efficient or economical for a rights holder to threaten the supply 
chain or customers of an alleged violator, rather than the actual infringer.214 
For example, the patent troll Innovatio, targeted the customers of Cisco and 
other router manufacturers with its cease-and-desist letters.215 Although 
 
 209. In Malin v. Singer, the California district court found that the attorney (Martin Singer) had 
sent an abusive letter, while the appellate court reversed. Malin v. Singer, No. BC466696, 2011 
WL 6070271 (Cal. Super. Nov. 29, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 304 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2013). In Flatley v. Mauro, the California courts held that the attorney’s letter (sent by 
Mauro) was abusive and amounted to extortion as a matter of law. Flatley v. Mauro, 18 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 472, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 139 P.3d 2, 24 (Cal. 2006). Commentators have been 
attempting to reconcile the two holdings. See Kennerly, supra note 135; Parker & Yang, supra note 
135. 
 210. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 161415 (2006). 
 211. See supra Part I.B (listing inappropriate legalese or other harsh or insulting language, 
demands for quick settlement, demands for immediate payment fees, and weak or unreasonable 
claims of rights violations as potential factors to determine abusiveness). 
 212. See supra note 205. 
 213. See Grinvald, supra note 169, at 152631 (discussing effective enforcement frameworks for 
abusive rights holders). 
 214. See id. 
 215. See Catching Up on . . . Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC’s Litigation Activities, supra note 185. 
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Cisco and other manufacturers brought a declaratory judgment action 
against Innovatio on behalf of its customers,216 other entities may not be so 
proactive and they will likely need to give into the cease-and-desist letter. 
4. Procedural Elements 
In addition to the substantive elements, there are a number of 
procedural elements that need to be implemented that are crucial to assisting 
low-resourced targets. First, the burden of proof of whether the letter is 
abusive would be on the letter sender. Second, fast-track status would be 
given to such lawsuits filed by abusive letter targets, similar to the special 
motions to strike filed under anti-SLAPP laws.217 Finally, if a court found a 
letter abusive, it would award damages, attorneys’ fees, and legal costs to the 
target. Each of these elements will be discussed in turn. 
a. Burden of Proof 
An important part of the anti-abusive threats cause of action would be 
having the burden on the sender of the letter to prove that the letter is not 
abusive.218 One main reason for this requirement is that the party who bears 
the burden of proof in civil litigation also bears the costs of producing 
evidence needed to resolve the dispute.219 Letter senders, unlike targets, are 
in the best practical and economical position to provide evidence to prove 
the information contained in the letter, why it chose to send the letter to the 
target, and the reasoning behind the letter’s settlement demand costs or 
timeframe. Since the sender wrote the letter, it presumably has easy access 
to all the evidence needed to satisfy its burden of proof. Thus, it is more cost-
effective for the sender to bear the burden, and it reduces the costs of bringing 
 
 216. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig., No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012 WL 8500139, 
¶ 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2012); see also Mark Chandler, Innovatio Case: Victory for Cisco Customers Makes the 
Case for Patent Reform, CISCO BLOGS (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://blogs.cisco.com/news 
/innovatio-case-victory-for-cisco-customers-makes-the-case-for-patent-reform. 
 217. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2015) (requiring the court to schedule 
a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion no more than thirty days after the service of the motion). 
 218. The burden of proof is an extremely important element of civil litigation, as who bears 
the burden oftentimes influences the outcome. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in 
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (1981) (“[T]he 
allocation of the burdens of proof during trial often has a significant effect on the outcome of a case 
and frequently may be dispositive.”). 
 219. Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1153 
(1972) (“On each issue in a case some party must carry the burden of producing evidence or lose at 
the hands of the judge . . . .”). 
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an anti-abusive threats cause of action for the target.220 
b. Fast-Track Status 
The length of litigation is a major contributor to its high cost. In 2012, 
the average hourly billing rate of an attorney employed by a private law firm 
in the United States was just under $400.221 The longer a legal dispute runs, 
the higher the legal bills. Implementing a “fast-track” status for anti-abusive 
threats lawsuits would attempt to alleviate some of the costs associated with 
a lengthy court case. The known expense of litigation is one of the elements 
contributing to the increasing use of cease-and-desist letters for legal dispute 
resolution, and granting fast-track status could make going to the courts more 
attractive. Additionally, high litigation cost is a factor that places low-
resourced targets in a coercive situation with well-resourced letter senders, 
and a knowingly quick judicial resolution would assist in overcoming the 
imbalance of power. Fast-track status would require a judge to schedule a 
hearing within a short timeframe after the defendant files a response.222 The 
notion of a fast-track status is not new: California’s anti-SLAPP law requires 
a judge to schedule a hearing on the special motion within thirty days from 
service.223 Other commentators have also proposed similar types of 
mechanisms to expedite cases involving low-resourced entities, such as 
specialized small claims courts.224 
c. Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, and Legal Costs 
The type of remedies available for a cause of action plays an important 
strategic role in determining whether to bring a case.225 Although most causes 
 
 220. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 
26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 41819 (1997) (providing an economic model demonstrating the optimal 
allocation of the burdens of proof in civil litigation). 
 221. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 49. 
 222. See Steven P. Aggergaard, Three State-Based Defenses to Consider, FOR THE DEFENSE, Apr. 
2012, at 16, 18, available at http://www.bassford.com/newsevents-pressrelease-0412-spa.pdf. 
 223. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2015). 
 224. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Department of Commerce Releases Worthless Report on Trademark Bullying, 
TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives 
/2011/04/department_of_c.htm. Additionally, Professor Irina Manta has suggested that the 
USPTO act in an oversight capacity to assist in these disputes. Manta, supra note 7, at 86671. 
Further, the USPTO requested comments as to whether the United States should establish a small 
claims proceeding for patent cases. See Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding 
in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec. 18, 2012). 
 225. For example, attorneys routinely strategize dispute resolution options based on the types 
of remedies involved. See Davis, supra note 122, at 14 (“[M]ost parties to lawsuits eventually decide 
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of action allow a winning plaintiff to recoup damages, recovering attorneys’ 
fees and legal costs is less typical.226 This is due to the “American rule” that 
requires each party in litigation to bear its own costs.227 However, certain 
types of litigation need incentives, or must at least be made easier to bring. 
Some courts recognize this need and allow for fee-shifting.228 Bringing an 
anti-abusive threats action should be encouraged, and implementing fee 
shifting provisions is critical because it may convince risk-adverse attorneys 
into taking on these cases. 
The ability to bring a preemptory action against an abusive letter sender 
would assist in altering the incentives and overcoming some of the 
characteristics plaguing low-resourced targets. While the proposed anti-
abusive threats law would not directly attack the problem of the over-
enforcement of legal rights, with serious legal consequences at stake for over-
enforcing one’s rights, it is likely that potential abusers would adopt a more 
appropriate approach to their legal rights enforcement efforts. However, due 
to the limitations of an anti-abusive threats law, additional measures are 
needed to fully address the problems facing low-resourced targets. 
B. Greater Involvement by Bar Associations 
In addition to the proposed anti-abusive threats law, greater 
involvement by state bar associations is needed in order to curb the 
incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters. The ABA and state bar 
associations are in a good position to assist in this effort because attorneys 
write the majority of cease-and-desist letters. As previously discussed, the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly cover the problem of 
abusive letters.229 Additionally, even if the rules explicitly prohibited abusive 
cease-and-desist letters, concerns with partisanship and the ability to 
objectively assess ethical violations would continue to exist.230 Although state 
 
to pursue or to settle their claims based on a cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 226. However, it is becoming more typical. See Rebecca Friedman, The Lodestar Ranger: 
Calculating Attorneys’ Fee Awards in Perdue v. Kenny A., 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 
58, 6263 n.31 (2009) (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 913 (3d ed. 2002)) (“More than 180 federal statutes and 4,000 state statutes authorize 
awards of attorneys’ fees.”). 
 227. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (recognizing 
the “American rule”). See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982). 
 228. For example, in civil rights litigation this has been termed the “private attorney general” 
situation. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d, 488 F.2d 559 (9th 
Cir. 1973). 
 229. See supra Part III.A. 
 230. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
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bar associations are aware of these problems, there is more that could be 
done to encourage and educate attorneys to self-regulate this specific form of 
problematic behavior. 
First, the ABA or state bar associations could issue formal ethics 
opinions stating that the Model Rules prohibit sending abusive cease-and-
desist letters. This would help clarify the applicability of the rules to this 
practice and hopefully reduce the incidences of attorney-written, abusive 
cease-and-desist letters. Second, state and local bar associations should 
conduct educational programs for its members on the particular issues that 
arise when dealing with low-resourced targets of cease-and-desist letters in 
order to help with the problem of partisanship. Finally, local bar associations 
should provide enhanced outreach to low-resourced targets to specifically 
educate them on how to handle cease-and-desist letters, which could assist in 
overcoming their inability to information-gather and in overcoming their 
susceptibility to inducement. 
1. Formal Ethics Opinion Interpreting Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to Prohibit Abusive Cease-and-Desist 
Letters  
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and 
state bar associations sometimes issue formal ethics opinions interpreting 
applicable ethical rules.231 These opinions range in topics, from interpreting 
the rules prohibiting sexual relations with clients to those allowing attorneys 
to communicate with clients through unencrypted email.232 State bar 
associations often address similar topics as the ABA.233 Although these ethics 
opinions are not formally binding, they are quite influential.234 
As discussed in Part III.A, Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 do not explicitly 
 
 231. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 468 (2014) 
(interpreting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.17 (2013)); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. 
on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 12-0007 (2014) (interpreting CAL. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100, 3-700(B)(2) (2013)). 
 232. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992) (discussing 
sex with clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) 
(discussing protecting the confidentiality of unencrypted email). 
 233. For example, in 2006, the ABA released a Formal Opinion on when “puffing” is 
appropriate in negotiations, and the California State Bar Association released a similar formal 
opinion in 2014. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006); 
Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 12-0007 (2014). 
 234. See Lawrence K. Hellman, When “Ethics Rules” Don’t Mean What They Say: The Implications 
of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 32526 (1996). 
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prohibit legal rights enforcement through the use of abusive cease-and-desist 
letters. While there are formal ethics opinions that discuss related areas, the 
lack of a formal ethics opinion directly on the topic of abusive cease-and-
desist letters leaves a gap in regulation. For example, ABA Formal Opinion 
94-383, “Use of Threatened Disciplinary Complaint Against Opposing 
Counsel,” interprets the Model Rules to prohibit attorneys from threatening 
to file disciplinary charges against an opposing counsel in order to coerce 
settlements.235 Where an attorney threatens to file a disciplinary charge, but 
has no actual intent to do so, this behavior is interpreted to violate Rule 4.1, 
which requires a lawyer to be truthful in dealings with others on a client’s 
behalf.236 While this formal opinion appears to address the prohibition of 
abusive letters generally, it is directed specifically at the use of an unrelated 
disciplinary action to coerce settlement. Abusive cease-and-desist letters 
contain threats that are related to the legal violation claims alleged in the 
letter. A formal ethics opinion that clarified that Model Rules 3.1, 4.4, and 
4.1 prohibited attorneys from sending abusive communications to adverse 
parties would assist in bringing awareness to this issue. 
While attorneys are aware of their ethical obligations to not allege weak 
or unreasonable legal rights violations, many are likely unaware of the 
additional requirement to be non-abusive.237 Unfortunately, it has become 
the norm in the legal profession to include abusive tactics and legalese to 
blanket cease-and-desist letters with a posturing air of seriousness or 
authority.238 A formal ethics opinion unambiguously stating the “do’s” and 
“don’ts” of cease-and-desist letters would clarify that the ethical obligations 
require attorneys to be non-coercive in private settlements. While this would 
help stem the incidences of abusive letters by changing the norms of the 
cease-and-desist letter process, problems associated with partisanship would 
still exist because attorneys would still be placed in situations where they are 
supposed to be advocating for one side, and therefore may not be objective 
judges of ethics.  
 
 235. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994). 
 236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2013). 
 237. However, recognition of an ethical rule does not translate into full compliance. See 
Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496. 
 238. See The Mechanics of Ethical and Effective Cease and Desist Letters, SMITH & HOPEN, 
http://www.smithhopen.com/litigation_cease_and_desist_letter_strategies.aspx (last visited Feb. 
20, 2015) (categorizing abusive cease-and-desist letters as the “furious demand,” and describing 
them as very common in intellectual property litigation). 
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2. Member Educational Campaigns 
As a complement to issuing a formal ethics opinion, state and local bar 
associations should undertake campaigns of their members to educate them 
on the myriad of issues associated with abusive cease-and-desist letters. These 
issues would include the confluence of factors identified in this Article that 
create a coercive settlement process for low-resourced targets. These types of 
educational campaigns are not new since some state and local bar 
associations already conduct similar types of campaigns, such as those 
promoting “civility.”239 For example, the San Diego County Bar Association 
(SDCBA) has undertaken a “Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and 
Professionalism,” in which it seeks to promote attorney civility inside and 
outside of the courtroom.240 To do so, it issued its own “Attorney Code of 
Conduct,”241 as well as “Guidelines for Effective and Professional 
Advocacy.”242 One of the SDCBA Guidelines states that “[i]n analyzing 
ethical dilemmas, do not simply ask yourself if it violates any law; also ask 
yourself if it is fair and if it is the right thing to do.”243 While this is an 
extremely helpful guideline, it is only useful insofar as attorneys view being 
abusive in cease-and-desist letters as an ethical dilemma. As previously 
discussed, partisanship aids in blinding attorneys from recognizing their 
ethical violations.244 Additional education is needed so attorneys can 
recognize ethical violations in the cease-and-desist letter process, which may 
include instruction on cognitive distortions.245 
 
 239. See, e.g., Journal News, Statewide Civility Initiative Will Encourage Conversations, TENN. BAR 
ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.tba.org/journal/statewide-civility-initiative-will-encourage-
conversations; Joseph Paul Justice Burke III, Reap What You Sow: Bar Leaders as Cultivators of Civility, 
38 BAR LEADER (Jan.–Feb. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/bar_leader/2013-
14/january-february/reap_what_you_sow_bar_leaders_as_cultivators_civility.html. 
 240. SDCBA Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and Professionalism, SAN DIEGO CNTY. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=Civility (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 241. The SDCBA Attorney Code of Conduct, SAN DIEGO CNTY. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=AttyCodeConduct (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 242. San Diego County Bar Association Guidelines for Effective and Professional Advocacy, SAN DIEGO 
CNTY. BAR ASS’N, https://www.sdcba.org/SDCBA/docDownload/15452 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015). 
 243. Id. 
 244. See supra Part III.A.2.a. 
 245. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 3738 (suggesting that cognitive bias awareness be 
included in legal education). 
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3. Outreach to Small Businesses and Individuals 
Finally, additional attention by state and local bar associations should 
be given to low-resourced targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters for two 
different reasons. First, access to legal resources could assist in overcoming 
an inability to information-gather, as well as lower the susceptibility to 
inducement. While many, if not all, state and local bar associations have pro 
bono programs and lawyer referral systems, these programs appear to be 
available only for indigent individuals facing personal legal issues.246 Low-
resourced targets may face threats to their personal life, but also to their 
business. While there are a few resources addressing these problems, better 
outreach is needed.247  
A few bar associations, like the Massachusetts Bar Association, have 
programs like “Dial-a-Lawyer,” which allows any Massachusetts resident to 
call and speak to a volunteer attorney about any legal problems or 
questions.248 The “Dial-a-Lawyer” service is offered every first Wednesday 
of the month for a two-hour period, and is intended to reach those in the 
community who could not otherwise access legal advice.249 Additional efforts 
like these are needed across the country, and additional publicity needs to be 
given to these types of programs so small businesses know that they do have 
access free or low-cost legal advice. 
Second, outreach to low-resourced entities should also educate this 
population about the appropriate behavior of attorneys and disputants. 
Enforcement of the rules governing attorney conduct is suboptimal due in 
part to ignorance of recipients of abusive cease-and-desist letters. While a 
number of local bar associations have attempted to mitigate some of the 
unawareness through online reporting systems,250 more can be done to 
 
 246. See, e.g., Legal Resource Finder—Find Legal Aid, MASSLEGALSERVICES, 
http://www.masslegalservices.org/findlegalaid (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (listing broad categories 
covering personal legal issues for which it provides assistance). 
 247. Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts is one organization that assists artists and cultural 
organizations. See, e.g., Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, ARTS & BUS. COUNCIL OF GREATER BOS., 
http://www.artsandbusinesscouncil.org/programs/volunteer-lawyers-for-the-arts.html (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015). In addition, law school clinics that focus on small business needs are a recently 
developed avenue of assistance for low-resourced targets. See, e.g., Intellectual Property & 
Entrepreneurship Clinic, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.suffolk.edu/law 
/academics/clinics/21858.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); USC Small Business Clinic, USC GOULD 
SCH. OF LAW, http://lawweb.usc.edu/why/academics/clinics/sbc/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 248. Dial-A-Lawyer Offers Free Legal Advice Each Month, MASS. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.massbar.org/for-the-public/need-a-lawyer/dial-a-lawyer (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 249. Id. 
 250. See, e.g., FAQS: How Do I File a Complaint Against an Attorney?, MASS. BAR ASS’N, 
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educate low-resourced entities and the general public about ethical attorney 
behavior and methods of reporting unethical behavior.251 
C. More Aggressive Action by the FTC and State Attorneys 
General 
While the two proposals above attempt to attack the problem of abusive 
letters from the sender side by altering the incentives to send an abusive letter, 
and from the target side by assisting in overcoming two characteristics 
creating a coercive settlement environment, the third characteristic—the 
inability to follow through with litigation—is not necessarily mitigated. One 
additional proposal to address this characteristic is to enlist the aid of the state 
attorneys general offices and the FTC. The state attorneys general and the 
FTC have attempted to utilize consumer protection law to stop abusive 
cease-and-desist letters from being sent to low-resourced targets.252 However, 
currently, such actions have been limited to exceptional situations involving 
a large volume of letters and deceptive letter senders.253 Attributing to this 
limited applicability may be the fact that the typical abusive cease-and-desist 
letter does not neatly fit within the regulations of consumer protection law, 
particularly where the letter is not deceptive.254 However, in a statement 
before a House of Representatives hearing on a current anti-patent troll bill, 
a representative for the FTC stated that the Commission believed it had the 
authority to enforce in this area, and the FTC was defending itself in a lawsuit 
by MPHJ Technology challenging its authority.255 
Another reason for the lack of widespread enforcement efforts may be 
the state attorneys general offices and the FTC’s lack of resources. As the 
enforcement agency for consumer protection laws, state attorneys general 
offices and the FTC enforce a range of different laws, and not just those 
pertaining to unfair and deceptive trade practices.256 With budget crunches 
 
http://www.massbar.org/for-the-public/faqs#13749 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); Lawyer Regulation, 
CAL. STATE BAR, supra note 165. 
 251. See, e.g., What Can I Do If I Have a Problem with My Lawyer, CAL. STATE BAR, 
http://calbar.ca.gov/Public/Pamphlets/ProblemwithaLawyer.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) 
(providing additional information educating the public about ethical attorney behavior). 
 252. See supra Part III.D. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. Some policymakers believe that this area should be subject to FTC enforcement. 
See Baluch, supra note 190, at 1720 (discussing the different methods that members of Congress 
presented attempting to allow the FTC to more directly regulate abusive demand letters). 
 255. See Statement of Lois Greisman, supra note 194. 
 256. See Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last visited 
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at state attorneys general offices across the nation, an issue needs to be a top 
priority in order to allocate funding, otherwise only the most egregious cases 
will likely be investigated.257 
Despite resource constraints, the FTC or state attorneys general could 
alternatively promulgate rules to combat abusive cease-and-desist letters. For 
example, the FTC obtains its authority to promulgate rules regarding unfair 
or deceptive trade practices from the Federal Trade Commission Act.258 As 
part of this rule-making power, the FTC has promulgated specific rules 
relating to abusive practices, such as creditor letters, and requires specific 
disclosures to be made to consumers regarding loans.259 A similar 
identification of abusive cease-and-desist letters as an unfair business 
practice, and perhaps requiring disclosures, could be promulgated through 
its rule-making authority. While this would not increase the resources that 
the offices have to enforce their rules, and thereby not necessarily assist in 
overcoming the inability to follow through with litigation, it could provide a 
deterrent effect to potential senders of abusive letters. 
V. Criticisms of Policing Cease-and-Desist Letters 
Although the proposals in Part IV attempt to police abusive cease-and-
desist letters, a number of potential downsides may detract from the urge to 
regulate this area of the law. Three main criticisms of such regulation are (1) 
the potential for encouraging litigiousness, (2) the potential for increasing the 
costs of enforcement for small businesses and individuals, and (3) over-
 
Mar. 15, 2015). 
 257. See, e.g., Timothy B. Wheeler, State Trying to Cope with Backlog of Pollution on Violation Cases, 
BALT. SUN (Nov. 29, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-29/features/bs-gr-enforce-
20111123_1_backlog-violations-enforcement (“And with the state’s budget crunch, MDE has been 
unable to get funds for more positions, so the attorney general’s office could not hire more lawyers 
to handle the jump in cases . . . .”); Pamela Prah, Texas Saves Big Money Through Effective Child Support 
Enforcement, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-
and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/09/21/texas-saves-big-money-through-effective-child-
support-enforcement (“On top of the state budget crunch, federal stimulus dollars for child support 
have run out. Overall, the attorney general’s office says it will have $110 million less in federal and 
state money for child support enforcement over the next two years than in the previous biennium.”); 
Christopher Wills, Illinois Attorney General Pushes Back on Budget, ST. J. REG. (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.sj-r.com/article/20120308/News/303089888 (“[Illinois Attorney General] is pushing 
back against the governor’s call for deeper budget cuts, saying her office’s ability to generate money 
for tax payers is already being threatened by low pay and low morale that make it hard to retain 
her top lawyers.”). 
 258. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (2012). 
 259. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (current through Mar. 12, 2015) (requiring lenders to inform 
cosigners about the nature of his or her liability). 
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regulating private dispute resolution. 
A. Potentially Encouraging Litigiousness 
This Article acknowledges that implementing an anti-abusive threats 
law could encourage an additional level of litigiousness.260 By providing 
targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters with a private cause of action, some 
targets may decide to unreasonably or frivolously interpret “abuse.” 
Additionally, some targets may unreasonably view any cease-and-desist letter 
as abusive.261 While this is a valid concern, it could be overcome by tailoring 
the new law in such a way to discourage frivolous abusive threats actions. 
One way to do this could be through a two-way fee shifting provision. Thus, 
whichever party loses the suit bears the burden of the attorneys’ fees for the 
other party. Such could deter the filing of frivolous complaints by adding a 
potential cost to the litigation.262 An example of such a mandatory two-way 
fee shifting provision is seen in California’s anti-SLAPP law.263 
Although there are reported cases where targets of cease-and-desist 
letters sue the sender,264 there is currently no outcry over frivolous lawsuits.265 
In fact, in some jurisdictions, such as in the United Kingdom, the opposite is 
true—legal advisers feel curtailed to send demand letters due to the potential 
 
 260. This is a concern of the United Kingdom, which recently undertook a review of their 
“groundless threats” law. See generally U.K. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 212: 
PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: GROUNDLESS THREATS (2013) [hereinafter 
U.K. LAW COMM’N: CONSULTATION PAPER]. 
 261. See U.K. LAW COMM’N, PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: 
GROUNDLESS THREATS 77 (Apr. 2014), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk 
/docs/lc346_patents_groundless_threats.pdf [hereinafter U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT] (“The 
difference between ‘mere notification’ and a threat is in the eye of the receiver . . . .”). 
 262. But see SUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLEY, ALASKA JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL, ALASKA’S ENGLISH RULE: ATTORNEY’S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES ES-1213 
(Oct. 1995), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfeeexec.pdf (noting that the effect of 
fee shifting provisions can be mixed and there is no empirical evidence to prove that it does 
discourage frivolous litigation); Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the 
Impact of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 23 (2012). 
 263. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West 2015) (“[A] prevailing defendant on a special 
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs. If the court finds 
that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court 
shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion . . . .”). 
 264. One recent example from Australia is Bell v. Steele, where the plaintiff (the target of the 
cease-and-desist letter) won and was awarded $147,000. Mary Still & Jessica Cowell, One Good Reason 
to Take Care Before Threatening Legal Action in Copyright Disputes, CLAYTON UTZ (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/edition/29_march_2012/20120329/one_good_reason
_to_take_care_before_threatening_legal_action_in_copyright_disputes.page. 
 265. It is difficult to prove a negative, and there are no direct statistics on this. 
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for a lawsuit, but do not complain about being overly sued.266 This evidence 
suggests that introducing an appropriately tailored, abusive threats action 
should not cause a drastic increase in litigation. 
B. Increasing Enforcement Costs for Small Businesses and 
Individuals 
Another serious concern with respect to the proposed abusive threats 
cause of action is that it could harm small businesses and individuals 
attempting to enforce their legal rights. If a small business or individual tries 
to enforce their legal rights by sending a cease-and-desist letter without the 
aid of an attorney, they could be subject to an abusive threats lawsuit. This 
criticism has merit and would force some small businesses and individuals to 
forgo enforcement altogether.267 The inability to enforce certain legal rights, 
such as intellectual property rights, is an argument that is used by some 
patent trolls as a benefit to having non-practicing entities.268 Patent trolls 
advocate that with an aggregation of patents and resources, the entity (not 
the small business or individual patent owner) can enforce rights that would 
otherwise be practically unenforceable.269 
However, this Article maintains that the current legal environment is 
such that small businesses and individuals already lack the ability to fully 
enforce their legal rights without additional assistance.270 An example is the 
 
 266. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 35 (reporting that some legal advisers 
may be reluctant to put their name to a letter). 
 267. Taken to the ultimate extreme, a lack of any enforcement by an intellectual property 
rights holder could mean a loss of the intellectual property right. See, e.g., 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:12 (4th ed. 2014) (“Laches is a 
good defense if plaintiff’s long failure to exercise its legal rights has caused the defendant to rely to 
its detriment by building up a valuable business around its trademark.”). While this is a rare 
scenario, it is an argument often used by those who would advocate against reform in this area. 
 268. See, e.g., Matt Levy, Three Myths About Intellectual Ventures, PATENT PROGRESS (Sept. 17, 
2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/09/17/three-myths-intellectual-ventures/ (reporting 
that it is a myth that Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll, helps small inventors). 
 269. See When Patents Attack, NPR (July 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money 
/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack (quoting Joe Chernesky, a vice-president at 
Intellectual Ventures) (“The neat thing about Chris is he had no idea how to get money for his 
patents. He had this great idea. These patents were immensely valuable because every technology 
company was adopting the technology. Yet he didn’t know how to get paid. He eventually found 
Intellectual Ventures. So we bought those patents.”). But see Mike Masnick, This American Life 
Followup on Patents Reveals Intellectual Ventures is Even Slimier Than Previously Believed, TECHDIRT (June 3, 
2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130603/11295023297/this-american-life-followup-
patents-reveals-intellectual-ventures-is-even-slimier-than-previously-believed.shtml. 
 270. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 65463 (arguing that small businesses and individuals 
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case involving Maureen Reddy, an individual inventor with a patent on a 
light shade design. In 2012 Reddy pitched her patented product design idea 
to Lowe’s Home Improvement.271 Despite her pending patent, Lowe’s 
subsequently began selling an extremely similar design.272 Reddy’s 
circumstances were such that she would not have been able to enforce her 
patent without the free representation provided by Suffolk Law School’s 
clinic.273 Therefore, even though there is a chance that adding a cause of 
action for abusive threats could raise the cost of enforcement for small 
businesses and individuals, overall the practical impact would likely be low. 
For enforcement to be more accessible for this population, greater access to 
low-cost or free legal assistance is needed, regardless of an additional abusive 
threats action. 
C. Over-Regulating Private Dispute Resolution 
A more theoretical concern with any proposal to police abusive cease-
and-desist letters is that this is merely another unnecessary intrusion into the 
private dispute resolution process of private individuals. Contained within 
this broader distaste for additional regulation of private disputes is a valid 
concern that the proposed abusive threats action could stymie good faith 
attempts at negotiating private settlements with alleged infringers.274 Since 
one of the overarching goals of this Article’s proposals is to encourage good 
faith attempts at discussion and negotiation between rights holders and 
targets, this concern is important. 
The experiences of other countries are instructive in assessing any 
proposed regulations. The United Kingdom Law Commission’s (the “Law 
Commission”) study of threats actions discovered that intellectual property 
rights holders feel thwarted when inquiring about potential infringements 
due to a fear of being sued for groundless threats.275 Although in the United 
Kingdom groundless threats law is slightly different than the one proposed, 
the recent review by the Law Commission suggests that the groundless 
threats law should be reformed to include an explicit safe harbor provision 
 
cannot and should not litigate trademark infringement claims). 
 271. David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes Early Victory Against Lowe’s, supra note 117. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. (quoting Eve Brown, the clinic’s director). 
 274. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 260, at 91109 
(documenting various problems that detract from good faith negotiation attempts). 
 275. See U.K. LAW COMM’N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 77. 
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for legitimate communications.276 This safe harbor is intended to allow for 
freer communications between an intellectual property rights holder and the 
alleged infringer. The elements of the communications protected by the 
United Kingdom’s proposed safe harbor are those to (1) track down the 
source of infringement; (2) prevent an infringer from raising an innocent 
infringer defense; or (3) open negotiations for license terms.277 A similar 
explicit safe harbor could be written into the proposed anti-abusive threats 
law, with elements focusing on reasonability and whether the sender was 
attempting to open the lines of communication between the two parties.278 
Although this Article does not advocate any particular elements for such safe 
harbor, elements could include a reasonable timeframe given to the target of 
the letter, and language to encourage the target to seek the advice of legal 
counsel to discuss the letter’s claims. 
Conclusion 
The increase in sending abusive cease-and-desist letters as a means to 
enforce legal rights is a nationwide phenomenon affecting entities and 
individuals of all different sizes, and has implications on private dispute 
resolution processes. Although this is problematic overall, it is particularly 
disturbing when the targets of abusive letters are small businesses and 
individuals due to the coercive negotiation environment created. When low-
resourced individuals or businesses enter into a settlement agreement with 
abusive letter senders, they are likely coerced due to their inability to 
information-gather, susceptibility to inducement, and an inability to finance 
the litigation. Therefore, such agreements should be declared void. However, 
due to the inability of this population to litigate, these coerced agreements 
would likely never be invalidated, and a situation of de facto enforceability of 
coerced agreements ensues. This Article proposes a number of different 
solutions to reduce the factors that create the coercive environment in the 
hopes of encouraging a good faith and more equalized settlement processes. 
While there are limitations and downsides to these proposals, particularly 
with respect to this Article’s proposed anti-abusive threats law, these solutions 
should be considered as part of an overall conversation regarding reform in 
the area of the abusive over-enforcement of legal rights. 
 
 276. Id. at 78. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Safe harbors, when designed appropriately, can be effective vehicles for cutting down on 
unwanted litigation. See Eric Goldman, Designing Optimal Immunities and Safe Harbors, TECH. & MKTG. 
LAW BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04 
/designing_optim_1.htm. 
